Energy Futures

The challenge of "green" is aggregating small amounts of energy – ultimately days of sunlight per surface^[1] – into amounts useable in quantity and continuity. Plants convert some of that energy continuously in daylight hours, but aggregating is the challenge. Currently we rely almost entirely upon a fossil fuel process that takes eons and is not sustainable – even if the amounts of recoverable fuels remains large, the environmental side effects are rising, not falling. Global economic growth has almost immeasurable benefits – hundreds of millions of Chinese no longer face hunger daily. Only recently has the government sufficiently overcome the fear of famine to eliminate the mandate that farmers grow grain. In China point- and regional-source pollution is now sufficiently bad to generate local political action, as it was first in California and then in the US as a whole in the 1960s. But no local government, and most national governments, are uninterested in denying access to electricity (air conditioning, refrigeration, lighting) or mobility (cars). Desirable or not, I don't think it's realistic to expect that governments will do much to repress energy demand. Supply-side developments are thus crucial. That means improving the feasibility of solar, wind, hydro and biomass.

One challenge is operational size. To what extent are economies of scale so intrinsic in the physics (and their engineering implementation) that only large facilities are feasible? Let me speculate on alternatives for wind power to frame this question.

Currently the trend is towards very large turbines. Winds blow stronger above ground; if you're building a tall tower, you then want to generate a lot of power per tower to cover costs. That may work, with better engineering of blades and generators and mechanical connections. Scale on the manufacturing side can help, as standardized designs lead to economies in production, from poles to turbine blades.

What would a small system look like, something found in every backyard? First, the turbines would have to be short and spin on a vertical rather than a horizontal axis; they couldn't look like windmills, but rather spinning windpoles that would face different wind sheer and so might be cheaper structurally – the pole would be the turbine access, with lower stresses cheap bearings or even bushings would do. Now close to the ground they'd "enjoy" far less wind, so would have to be really cheap. Windpoles might be relative to windmills on a watt-hour basis.

Then there's the aggregation issue. Such windpoles probably couldn't each turn a generator, that would be too high in cost per unit of energy. They might however be able to turn a small scroll compressor that would feed through standard lines to a centrally located turbine. Scroll compressors are pretty well understood, there are lots of refrigerators and air conditioners out there. Storing compressed air is also a mature technology, providing a means to enhance continuity. Small air tools – small turbines – have also been around a long time. So the pieces could be assembled quite readily.

I'm not enough of an engineer to cost any of this out. There may be simply too little wind energy at ground level. But versions of this – systems whose cheapness and small size make up for conversion efficiency – seem worth exploring. Perhaps they already have been, and have been found wanting. But in some parts of the world small rooftop solar water panels are pervasive – highly inefficient in the amount of energy they convert but so cheap as to make sense.

...[we'll see] a multiplicity of energy systems … [as in] vehicle drivetrains

In any case, any attempt to move away from fossil fuels is likely to lead to a multiplicity of energy systems – just as we are currently seeing a growing variety of vehicle drivetrains, depending on local fuel options and driving patterns.

mike smitka

Note 1. Nuclear – including geothermal – and tidal sources are exceptions. While in principle fusion is possible only uranium-based fission is commercially available, but that suffers from both political and economic pressures that make it a small slice of currently harnessed energy. Geothermal and tidal energy are at present unimportant.

What’s With the Higher New Vehicle MSRPs?

Ruggles – AFN – Dec 2013

The price of new vehicles has been rising at a steady rate despite record auto manufacturer profits.  This has been accomplished by just raising the price, through added content to base vehicles, and reduced expenditure on incentives. What is driving this trend? I see no evidence of any real movement in manufacturing costs. Labor costs via the D3 UAW contract are locked in for the next few years. What’s the deal?

Many believe the industry is preparing for the inevitable interest rate rise which will most certainly begin as early as next spring. Providing we get through the next round of debt ceiling issues in Congress in one piece and the economy remains resilient, new Federal Reserve Chairman Janet Yellen and her Board of Governors will need to begin backing of the level of stimulus the Fed has poured into the economy. That means interest rates have to rise.

Our industry has been enjoying the longest span of low interest rates I’ve seen in over 40 years. Dealers are often in the position of being in a positive cash flow position on their floor plan account, receiving more from their OEM in floor plan subsidy than they pay out in interest to their floor plan lender. Many have been lulled into thinking this is the way it is supposed to be, and that it will continue. I don’t normally make predictions, but I can guarantee that this is NOT the case and it will NOT continue. Our industry needs to brace for more normal interest rates. I believe that is exactly what the OEMs are doing.

The higher MSRP prices mean OEMs are positioning themselves to be able to offer below market interest rate subventions in an attempt to maintain volume momentum in the face of the inevitable rate increases. While subventions will most certainly be offered through OEM captive finance arms, manufacturers might also need to offer enhanced incentives for those buyers the “captive” doesn’t want to finance, for either credit or advance reasons.

Regardless, the subventions will funnel more business to “captives” and away from independent banks and credit unions. We’ll also see continued growth in leasing through “captives” with significant money factor subventions. Independent lenders who lack OEM support need to prepare for the inevitable downturn in business.

Dealers need to prepare for a flattening out of vehicle sales traffic while consumers adjust to the new reality. Dealers also need to prepare for a rise in floor plan costs by watching their inventory levels more closely. This hasn’t been much of a problem given the recent balance between production and demand, but a flattening out of sales traffic could change that quickly.

The pre-owned side of the business will also be impacted. In particular, the Certified Pre-Owned business will see challenges. As real market interest rates increase, the payments on a Certified Pre-Owned vehicle will rise to where there won’t be enough difference between the subvented payment on a new vehicle and the non subvented payment on a CPO unit to warrant a consumer considering the CPO vehicle. OEMs who aren’t prepared to subvent on the CPO side of their business, and to offer residual based financing alternatives for consumers, could be in for a shock. As CPO sales slow and inventory backs up manufacturers could see a sudden decline in late model pre-owned values as dealers aren’t so eager to stock CPO inventory at the same level as they did in a market with the artificially low interest rates they have enjoyed for the last few years. Against this backdrop, there are hundreds of thousands of fresh lease returns scheduled to reenter the pre-owned market.

As ex Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin once famously said, “The job of the Federal Reserve is to take away the punch bowl just as the party gets going." This was in the context of raising interest rates just when the economy approaches peak activity after a recession. Given the long run of low interest rates and the dramatic increase in money supply through Federal Reserve Quantitative Easing, this axiom has never been more important.

The punchbowl is about to disappear and it’s time to prepare for it.

NADA White Paper on Incentives

I found the NADA White Paper on Used Vehicle Depreciation (pdf) interesting. Key sections are:

• Why we’ve seen so much volatility in depreciation in the past
• What to expect in terms of depreciation through 2014
  
• How external factors influence depreciation trends
  
• Which vehicle segments face a greater upturn in depreciation

Ruggles

“Buy a Car, Get a Check” and the recent NADA White Paper on Incentives

ruggles: the following is a collection of notes and has not a published column.

NADA recently published a long awaited white paper on incentives. While it is chock full of salient data and information, there are some things missing. I will try to fill in some blanks based on my own experience and perception. Before getting into the discussion, it is important to understand that the conclusion of the report, that incentives degrade residual values and therefore brand equity, is unassailable. My purpose is to add to the discussion.

I began my auto business career in 1970 in a Chrysler Plymouth dealership. Markup on full sized vehicles was 22.5% with a 2% holdback. At GM and Ford, I believe the holdback was 2.5%. There was an annual carry over allowance of 5% that Chrysler dealers counted on to move end-of-model-year inventory. At the low end, the markup was 14.5% on a Valiant or Duster.

No one was too worried about Toyota and Datsun in those days, but Volkswagen was certainly a factor. I have no idea what incentives and marketing strategies those auto makers used in those days.

My first recollection of “stair step” incentives was in the middle 1970s, perhaps as early as 1974. I recall a stair step incentive based on an assigned objective on Plymouth Valiant models. I recall a Guaranteed Value Program (GVP) on Chrysler Imperial leases that provided a $900 payment on leased Imperials to even out their resale value with a Cadillac Sedan de Ville. Those leases were privately capitalized lease company transactions. “Showroom Leasing” as we know it today hadn’t yet been invented.

To add additional perspective, a “long term” finance contract was 36 months in those days, with some 24 and 30 month terms occasionally used by borrowers. Borrowed down payments were fairly common, with a buyer trip to the “mouse house for a dip” being common in the vernacular of the day. An average interest rate was 6% ADD ON, which was about 12% APR. The Federal Truth in Lending Act had been passed in 1968 and even though the payment books of the day were based on an “Add On” interest calculation, the actual APR had to expressed on the bank contract along with the finance charge and the total of payments.

The first consumer rebate came about as a consequence of the recession triggered by the 1973 Middle East war and the OPEC oil embargo. Ex major league baseball player Joe Garagiola was everywhere with Chrysler/Plymouth advertising in 1975 with, “Buy a Car, Get a Check.” Chrysler led the auto industry in pulling the U.S. economy out of recession. There was considerable pent up demand and the new purchase activity quickly cleared dealer inventory, prompting them to order more. Soon the auto plants were humming again.

An ongoing problem in the economy was “stagflation” and the resulting MSRP price increases spawned the advent of 48 month term auto loans. In the run up to the 1979 Iran hostage crisis, and another spike in fuel prices, Chrysler was near death. They continued to build cars on speculation, as they had done for years, but the dramatic slowdown in sales stopped dealers from ordering inventory. That didn’t stop Chrysler from continuing to build. They stacked the unsold vehicles in every parking lot they could find. They booked the vehicles as assets, but they were running out of cash. It was common to see weeds growing up through the gap between the fenders and hood of these vehicles waiting for a dealer to order them. Thermostats rusted shut, resulting in engine damage when the vehicles heated up when they were loaded and unloaded for transport. These vehicles were largely odd ball color and equipment combinations as they were built with whatever parts Chrysler had available at the time. To move this inventory and produce sorely needed cash, Chrysler paid its dealers big money per vehicle up front, as well as offering a large consumer rebate. Chrysler drafted the dealers’ floor plan accounts immediately before shipping the vehicles, while paying the dealer for the purchase incentives and consumer rebates months later.

Of course, all of this crushed the company’s already weak resale values. I recall paying $4250 for a 1979 Dodge St. Regis in 1980. I bought the car for my parents. The vehicle had an original MSRP of about $10,400 and had 6,000 miles on it. As a percentage of original MSRP, these incentives must have set “all time” records. So did warranty claims. The best values were the low mile pre-owned vehicles that were everywhere.

While I don’t have “first hand” knowledge, I have reason to believe that similar measures were in place at the other domestic OEMs.

The industry saw another period of extreme production pushed via incentives when the domestic OEMs, in particular, short-cycled rental vehicles, producing large volumes of off-rental units at really cheap prices in the late 1990s. This situation created an opportunity for some of the most compelling pre-owned lease payments the world has ever seen. Lenders failed to account for the drop in residual value precipitated by the flood of rental returns to the market. So did the common residual guides. It wasn’t uncommon to see a lender guarantee the value of a vehicle 36 months out at a higher value than it could be purchased from auction a year old. The industry saw reverse amortization leases.

Astonishingly, the lenders, who took great pride in their “risk mitigation” departments, failed to pick up on this. The result was predictable. Many banks refrain from pre-owned leasing today because they think pre-owned leasing is risky. If they think they can guarantee the value of a vehicle 36 months from now at a higher value than it can be purchased for today, it might be a little risky. This same anomaly happened again in 2008 when fuel prices killed the current market on pre-owned "heavies."

...invoice hasn’t been “Invoice” for over 30 years

Against this historical backdrop lies my major point: Through all of this, banks still used “Invoice” as their “advance” or “amount financed” lending guideline. They still use it today. Invoice hasn’t been “Invoice” for over 30 years, as is well-observed in the NADA report.

Since the late 1970s, dealer transactional gross profit has moved from above invoice to below invoice. The average consumer pays less for a new vehicle than the dealer pays the factory when the OEM drafts on the dealer’s floor plan account. Gross profit has moved from “over invoice” to “trunk money.” The amount financed is MUCH higher as a percentage of dealer NET vehicle cost than it ever has been, while at the same time, loan terms have increased from 48 to 60 and now 72 months and higher. Now we see 84 and 96 month terms becoming common. Negative equity on a trade in is much more common than not, despite the recent strengthening of used vehicle values. That will be temporary, as it reflects a pre-owned inventory shortage resulting from slow new-car sales during the Great Recession amplified by Cash for Clunkers.

Bottom Line: Rebates go with extended term financing like peanut butter goes with jelly. Certainly, the approach imports have taken is preferable to that taken by OEMs who use customer cash. But as long as extended term is what is used to provide low monthly payments, consumer rebates and trunk money will remain with us, for better or worse.

But there’s more to this story! As mentioned in the NADA White Paper, there was a point where the OEMs began to reduce dealer markup over invoice. This has certainly contributed to dealership sales staff turnover as well as reduced new vehicle margin as a percent of sales. We used to make $1300 gross profit on a new vehicle when the MSRP was $10K - $12K. Reduced margin over invoice also helped fuel the move to gross profit as “trunk money” instead of gross profit over “Invoice.” Hell, some dealers START their deals from “Invoice” these days. Most consumers have been trained to feel they have the “right” to know the dealer’s invoice, and the industry has a plethora of vendors eager to give it to them. That genie isn’t going back in the bottle. But I find it interesting that so many dealers actually fund the same vendors who demonize them to the consumer one minute, while providing the dealer’s proprietary information the next.

The point is that our industry, on purpose or inadvertently, has made it a highly complex task to determine the actual net cost of a new vehicle. Dealership staff themselves have a difficult time figuring it out, as evidenced by the regular charge backs that occur as a result of factory incentive audits. The world seems to be clamoring for even more transparency while dealers know that if their own staff know their true net cost, they couldn't wait to give that away too. And there are always vendors to help that process along.

With the “stair step incentives,” Customer Satisfaction Index kickbacks, and purchase cash money on top of “First Time Buyer,” “Plumber,” "Realtor,” “Glass Company,” “Loyalty,” “Conquest,” “College Grad,” "Friends and Family" and “Military” incentives, who can figure it all out? To a consumer, it’s like drinking through a fire hose. A skeptic might think this is by design. I think it’s the only way our industry holds on to the embarrassingly low gross profits it maintains today.

While the NADA White Paper on incentives is salient, I’d like to add these points to mix for consideration.

Smitka adds that the transaction pricing variance – still there in the earlier days of larger differentials in bargaining skills – makes econometric studies of vehicle demand a challenge. Indeed, AutoFacts (now part of PwC?) began as an effort by a former GM economist William Pochiluk to build a database of prices that corrected as best as possible for invoice versus list and rebates by marketing region and date. Yet I've read papers published in top economics journals that use list price, though it's well-known that there are systematic and non-trivial price differences across the model year. Some is laziness in searching for better data, some may be the lack of budget to buy the cooperation of AutoFacts. Take statistical studies of auto demand with a large grain of salt!

The Best Selling Vehicles by State

David Ruggles

I found this chart from Dealer Communications quite interesting. Business Insider notes the following on the topic:

The auto industry has become so globalized, you can find the same Ford in Detroit and in Beijing. So it’s not surprising that Americans’ taste in passenger vehicles has become a bit homogenized.

To find how much difference there is in our car-buying habits, we asked Kelley Blue Book to pull the data from the start of the year to find the best-selling ride in each state.

Not surprisingly, Ford F-Series family of trucks dominated the list, coming in at number one in more than 30 states. But Americans elsewhere have different tastes: Florida and Maryland went for the Toyota Camry. Hawaii liked the Toyota Tacoma.

So regions persist – large pickup trucks are near-unique to the US and Thailand – amidst increasingly global tastes, as per an earlier post reflecting an interview with just-retired Ford Chief Creative Officer J Mays at World Cars World Trade.

Why Pay for Science?

Mike Smitka

In my Industrial Organization class we chatted about the logic of funding basic science in a world of which the US is an ever-smaller slice.^[1] The economic gains to basic research remain highly uncertain, and applications may not come for decades.^[2] Furthermore, science is mobile: conventions are international in nature, results – in economics, working papers indexed HERE – are disseminated rapidly. So aren't the incentives to free ride? At the level of a US state there's no obvious need to fund basic science, yet the focus of "flagship" universities is just that (and liberal arts colleges such as Washington & Lee face pressures from accreditation, reputation and faculty peer pressure to be mini-Harvards).

The public policy temptation is to free ride upon the R&D expenditures of others.

One retort is that while Science may be borderless, tacit knowledge remains important and "lab rats" and their equipment aren't mobile. The benefits come from commercialization, which benefits from ready access, hence we should find activities co-locating, with a research university the magnet. So there's a body of work on the geography of biotech firms and semiconductor firms, whether you get clusters of high-value-added enterprises with high growth potential centered around universities. I don't know the current state of the literature, but I strongly suspect that if you could undertake a cost-benefit analysis, the magnitude of the benefits of such spin-offs is a fraction of the cost of funding PhD programs.

Now in fact some states have been dropping their funding. In both Virginia and Michigan the public component of UVA (15%?) and UofM (5%?) is modest. In effect, they've become private schools building upon large investments in plant and equipment funded by state taxes but reliant on outside grants and alumni support for ongoing operations. What of a University of South Dakota or a University of Arkansas? Have they maintained funding? I don't know – it might be a good term paper topic when I teach the class in 2014!^[3]

In any case, research universities look to benefit financially from R&D technology licensing. The patent component of that can be tracked, but not all technology is covered by patents.^[4] Now I'm not sure that's a great argument when approaching the state legislature – doesn't that translate into a case for cutting support? But it certainly is part of the wider discussion of the benefits of funding R&D. So here the NYTimes science section reports that "Patenting ... Does Not Pay...". The underlying Valdivia Brookings study is part of a larger project on technology – see for example the Rothwell et al. Brookings paper on the regional nature of R&D. But what Valdivia focuses upon is the growth of Technology Transfer Offices. His 1999 base consists of TTOs in 174 institutions, up from 30 in 1979 (there are more TTOs today). He tracks their performance through 2012. Only 8 of these universities generated substantial revenue; most TTOs did not even cover staff expenses.

The danger is that no one will fund R&D.

So should states fund university research? The thrust of the Brookings project is that there are a lot of spinoffs. But to me the small number of winners (most patents come from a handful of metropolitan areas) suggest that it's good national policy but not good state-level policy – indeed Brookings work also shows that Federal R&D is more productive. That leaves open the question of who should fund "STE" (science-technology-engineering) training. The danger is that no one will fund it.

Note 1. Cf. Einstein's 1905 work on the photoelectric effect, which lies behind the xerox machine. The first patent drawing upon that did not come until 30 years later – Chester Carlson's first "electrophotography" patent of 1938, using a zinc plate and sulfur powder, not a selenium drum and carbon toner. Practical development did not start until 1946 and the first plain paper copier was not launched until 1959, though along the way the Haloid Corporation (later renamed xerox) developed specialized copiers for lithography and microfilms. [Photomultiplier tubes date back to 1934, building on a 1919 patent, and related experiments aimed at developing a TV camera using the photoelectric effect go back at least to 1926, so the "first" above is specific to copying technologies.]

Note 2. With a population of 316 million, we remain a large slice of the global economy even with the growth of China and Brazil and {hopefully} India and sub-Saharan Africa.

Note 3. Brookings claims that state R&D funding is increasing, Federal declining. See here. It's a brief note so provides no data, but outlines a version of the public good externality argument motivating this post.

Note 4. One anecdote – which is not "data" only an indication that exceptions exist – is flu vaccines. The underlying R&D was done at the University of Michigan (mea culpa: my brother worked in that lab for many years), and it continued to do the legwork of turning out the actual base vaccine, which includes various flu strains basic on work predicting which would be prevalent in the next flu season. Actual production was then handed off to commercial vaccine companies. When the head of the lab retired, it was closed and all work was transferred to outside commercial firms – none in Michigan. We as a society benefit enormously from that work, and likely most of the funding was Federal. But the commercial benefits didn't come back to benefit Ann Arbor, and private benefits are certainly not restricted to US citizens!

BK + Five Years

Automotive News has a retrospective with brief quotes from various participants. Let me briefly mention three that I found thoughtful despite the brevity imposed by the 2-page layout.

First, Mike Jackson of AutoNation notes the severity of the situation, with the possibility of a precipitous bankruptcy cascading across the economy: "We were at times within 24 hours of everything we knew being swept away." It is easy to forget exactly how dire things were, because of the interconnected nature of the supplier chain, and feed-on effects to the financial sector.

Second, John Krafcik, CEO of Hyundai American Motor, notes that car companies are wholesalers, so that when dealers stop buying cars, even at a comparatively healthy company "our cash flow began to get precipitously low" despite negotiating expensive one-off deals with banks to butress their position. But his snippet focuses on the interconnected nature of dealerships, as many of their 800 stores also had GM and Chrysler franchises. That parallel with the supply chain is easy to overlook.

Years back I read Krafcik's 1988 MIT master's thesis. He was a GM employee seconded to the now-shuttered NUMMI joint venture with Toyota, and coined the phrase "lean production" in a paper that later formed one piece of the 1990 IMVP book Machine That Chained the World.

Third, and not least is a short note by Shelly Lombard, an automotive analyst.

It wasn't really a surprise. It didn't mean the company wasn't viable, but it was just clear that this thing needed to be restructure. ... Companies don't go into bankruptcy because the earnings are bad. They go into bankruptcy when they run out of cash.

And of course "GM was blowing through cash" and [unlike Ford] had not mortgaged the company in advance of the crisis to create a cushion. "...so you knew the wheels were about to come off the car."

Mike Smitka

Data update: November 2013

Here are assorted data for your perusal – unfortunately due to the government shutdown data releases are delayed or (for certain data) a month will be skipped. For example, the "Employment Situation" was scheduled for November 1st; instead it will come out November 8th. Click on charts to expand to full size. – note that except for a large (negative) blip in the unemployment data, released after this post was written, it's more of the same. With the end of the government shutdown next month will likely see a rebound in the opposite direction.   

First, the first three charts on employment show a slow gain relative to age-adjusted population growth, but only slow. We still are far below normal levels of employment, and there's no particular reason to think that the fundamental structure of the labor markets and participation decisions changed over the course of a few months back in 2008-9 – no big shift in the ability to claim disability, no basic change in unemployment benefits, no change in wages [indeed, this recession reinforces the claim that wages are rigid downward, absent inflation], and I've already corrected the data for boomer retirement. That's clear if you look at the fourth chart of age-specific participation rates. Older workers – those of historic retirement age – are working more than ever [the chart gives data only from 2000, before then employment structures were relatively stable]. But in 2009 the share of people working in prime age brackets dropped, and that of younger people plummeted. Basically, while the economy is growing, it's not growing enough to eliminate the excess capacity of the Great Recession.

The fifth chart is investment. Again, we're out of the trough of 2009, but the level is still below that of some previous recessions. So more of the same: the economy is growing, but not recovering quickly.

That's not true for all sectors. As per the sixth chart, car sales have boomed; suppliers are at capacity, makers are having a hard time launching new vehicles at target levels of output. Still, we remain below the hyped level of the 2000s, and my sense is that sales are leveling out. There's still an overhang of vehicles from the go-go years, though depreciation operates far more rapidly in housing market. At the micro level I'm an example: since I'm stuck with an unsold house, we waited to replace our aging (240K miles 15 years) Volvo until the last minute – it wouldn't restart in the dealership parking lot so they gave me a tradein value lower than the local junkyard. We did buy a new car, as I judged the price differential relative to used cars too slim. However, too many people are underwater on their mortgages, median income [the point at which half the population has higher, half lower income] is falling. So my judgement is that the upside isn't going to move up very fast, despite our rising population. And while I only include the last couple years in the seventh chart, market shares have been relatively stable – with Toyota and Honda at a lower level. The eighth and final chart is of market groups. The top 4 firms have in the aggregate lost share, but over 2012-13 the Big Three and the Detroit Three have been stable.

Finally, interest rates have dropped back to the new normal under the Fed's antirecessionary monetary policy. With the fears of default eased, short rates are essentially zero. Now from day to day rates jump around, but remain extraordinarily low by historic standards, all the way out to 30 years. The yield curve is flat at maturities under 5 years, but there's now a moderately steep differential at longer maturities. With rates low, this isn't reflecting expected inflation but rather that eventually the economy will recover and with it short-term interest rates will rise. The market, however, is pricing that as years away – like 3-5 years. That is unfortunately consistent with my straight-line projection of labor market growth – at the current pace the gap won't be erased until the start of 2019. While I would not be surprised to see things accelerate as the housing stock normalizes ... well, the housing stock doesn't normalize quickly: according to the IRS, which is generous in such things, depreciation takes 30 years, and with median incomes stagnant, half the population isn't in a position to upgrade their "digs".

Date	1 month	3 mo	6 mo	1 yr	2 yr	3 yr	5 yr	7 yr	10 yr	20 yr	30 yr
10/15/13	0.32	0.14	0.16	0.16	0.37	0.68	1.45	2.11	2.75	3.50	3.78
10/16/13	0.14	0.10	0.11	0.15	0.34	0.64	1.41	2.06	2.69	3.43	3.72
10/17/13	0.01	0.05	0.08	0.13	0.33	0.61	1.35	1.98	2.61	3.36	3.66
11/05/13	0.06	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.32	0.60	1.39	2.06	2.69	3.46	3.76