Mitsubishi Motors: Going, going ... gone?

Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (MMC) is trumpeting record profits. I'm not convinced things are so rosy: they've also just restructured debt, with its four main creditors – and largest shareholders – taking an average 25% haircut on their preferred shares, to the tune of ¥95 billion (US$950 million), something made clear only in its Japanese-language filings. Perhaps they want a tax writeoff and figure their last bailout won't be recouped. But it also provides MMC with a clean ownership structure that would make a sale easier. Whether anyone would want to buy them is less clear: the company has a stormy history that includes 2 failed sales and an unenviable strategic position. They aren't unique in this; many other small firms have failed or changed hands in the past half dozen years. But they're more likely to be a Saab story than any of the other Japanese bit players.

...they're more likely to be a Saab story than other Japanese bit players...

Mitsubishi Motors' origins saddled it with an inefficient structure. During World War II Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) made munitions ranging from warships to the Zero fighter. After 1945 the US Occupation split up the firm into 3 pieces, each of which made different sorts of motor vehicles – three-wheeled cars, scooters, commercial trucks – as they struggled to find things to sell in the grim 1940s and early 1950s. After the Occupation ended MHI's former pieces merged. The end result was the Mizushima plant in western Japan producing minicars ("kei" cars), Okazaki in central Japan making passenger cars, and Maruko in Tokyo (eastern Japan) making trucks, all within the larger MHI with its industrial machinery, shipbuilding and heavy equipment operations.

Then along came Chrysler, wanting to source small cars in Japan to provide dealers with something to compete against the VW Beetle, which in 1968 sold 600,000 units. (Ford and GM did the same thing, eventually ending up with controlling stakes in Toyo Kogyo – renamed Mazda to echo its brand – and Isuzu.) So in 1970 MHI bundled together the three automotive pieces into MMC and set it up as an independent company, with Chrysler to take a 35% stakeholding (which under Japanese corporate law would give them veto rights and hence potentially de facto control). But Chrysler entered one of its periodic crises and couldn't raise the cash, leaving it with a 15% stake in an unwieldy company. MHI and its bankers remained as the dominant shareholders. While MMC and Chrysler set up Diamond-Star, a joint venture assembly plant in Illinois that opened in 1988, by 1991 Chrysler had sold its share in MMC and various joint ventures.

[An aside: Chrysler purchased its stake in direct contravention to MITI's industrial policy of preventing foreign ownership in the industry – when push came to shove they lacked the clout to make such policies stick, cf. IBM's operations in Japan.]

Then in 2000 DaimlerChrysler bought into MMC, eventually holding 37.5% of the company. But MMC performed poorly, not helped by Daimler's management, and by 2004 that stake was sold off, with Daimler keeping MMC's truck division, Fuso, the one piece that made strategic sense for its Asian production base and array of drivetrains.

In the background is a rollercoaster history of a piece with Chrysler. The initial spinoff from MHI coincided with the success of the Galant passenger car in Japan. MMC then entered the US market, as did the partners in the other Detroit Three alliances. Unlike Isuzu and Mazda, both of which ceased production in the US, MMC never shuttered its plant in Illinois, despite low capacity utilization and poor North American sales. Inside Japan sales did well during Japan's bubble, with MMC introducing new brands, including the luxury Diamante. Again, given the bubble context, that didn't go well. Next MMC rode the sport utility boom with the Pajero, its Jeep-like product. It was the first firm to do so in Japan, and until rivals entered it earned a lot of money. Meanwhile it expanded overseas, with assembly plants not just in the US but also NedCar in Europe, Chrysler's old operation in Australia, a tie-up with Proton in Malaysia, and stand-alone operations in Thailand.

Most fared poorly. Its bubble-era brands are gone, as are its European and Australian operations. Domestically it turned out a bit over 500,000 vehicles in 2013, but 60% of those were exported. With the yen weak (today at ¥101 per US$) exports are far now profitable. Exports are also the focus of their US operations, which currently turn out 70,000 SUVs a year. Butexports are an expedient, not a strategy, only grasping at a short-term profit source. Meanwhile, 60% of domestic sales are of minicars. That's good news, because sales of that segment are rising (up 10% over the last year) but it's also bad news, because low-priced cars cannot possibly generate the profits needed to keep the company going.

...exports are an expedient, not a strategy...

International operations, centered in Thailand and with joint ventures in China and Russia, look better. In terms of production they are the same order of magnitude as MMC's domestic operations. But because most of domestic production is exported, the international-to-domestic sales mix is closer to 90:10 than 50:50. What has tided the company over were one-off OEM deals with Nissan, Honda and others, and its pickups in Thailand and SUVs in other developing markets such as Russia and China.

In Japan, Europe and North American its dealership networks remain weak. For example, in Japan it was late to expand into urban areas, and so had poor locations and poor franchisees. In order to finance its urban presence MMC resorted equity stakes, and then dispatched managers from the manufacturing side who seldom proved adept at running dealerships. In North America and Europe it is hampered by years of poor sales and an uncertain product strategy. Inside Japan contract production arrangements with several manufacturers have been cancelled; it has exited the "kei" (minicar) segment. Only repeated infusions of equity from the Mitsubishi family of companies kept it afloat.

Thus MMC is a firm with a strong presence in Southeast Asia. It has modest operations in China, though as typical of late entrants its factories are scattered from Manchuria to Guangzhou. Then there's a production base in Japan. Its product lineup is good for the developing world, but in 3 of the 4 largest markets – North America, Europe and Japan – its product mix is weak. The company is thus claiming it will ride emerging market dynamism to success. Elsewhere its focus is electric vehicles, to me a dim idea. But where will it be able to generate profits sufficient to sustain its engineering operations and factories in Japan? And without a steady stream of new products, all facing the expensive engineering challenges of increasing demands for fuel efficiency, low emissions, safety and connectivity, it can't survive.

So selling the firm strikes me as their last straw. For whom would a purchase make sense? Its current alliances with Nissan-Renault make that a possible option, as they can potentially use MMC's plants (though not its dealers in the US, Japan and Europe). Perhaps a Chinese company can be tempted, as with PSA and Volvo. But as I see it, Chrysler is the one global player with a footprint in North America and Europe that lacks a strong presence in China and developing Asia, the regions where MMC is least weak. If so, this would be the third attempt involving some iteration of Chrysler. But remember, three strikes and they're out. And that will be MMC's fate, if it can't sell itself before the yen again strengthens.

...three strikes and they're out...

GM and the Upcoming Presidential Election

by David Ruggles

Amid the political turmoil of election season the rescue of the domestic auto industry by the George W. Bush administration and the Obama Administration is certainly a political football. The President and the Democrats have to defend the fact that the “rescue” wasn’t done perfectly, although a debate rages over exactly what those imperfections might be and who is responsible for them. Many Republicans are sticking to their position that the domestic auto industry should have been allowed to liquidate and eventually reform, although that logic doesn’t play well in the key “swing states” Ohio and Michigan. Governor Romney was adamantly against the “bailout” saying “Let Detroit go Bankrupt” and declaring that “a bail out would insure their failure.” Of course, this is all confused by Romney’s attempt in the Republican debates to actually take credit for the rescue saying, “They took my advice.” (His campaign has repeatedly declined comment when asked to clarify their candidate’s position on the issue.)

It also seems to ignore the fact that in the case of liquidation, there would have obviously been a huge cost dropped on the various states for unemployment compensation, a ripple impact through the banking system, chaos in the supplier base, and a disruption of military procurement. The ultimate result could have been a true Depression. Most pragmatic politicians wouldn’t have taken the risk, despite rhetoric to the contrary.

Some of the criticism leveled at supporters of the auto manufacturer rescue is based on the fact that if GM stock were liquidated today, based on its current value which is down a third since its’ IPO date, the taxpayers would sustain a loss in the tens of billions of dollars, which is entirely true. Of course, no one has calculated the cost of NOT doing the rescue, a calculation which would have to be based on speculation and would be subject to considerable argument.

Another issue rarely heard has to do with the billions of dollars of pension liabilities that would have been dropped on the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. While a close estimate of that financial burden is not available, a comparison is. When United Airlines dropped their pension liabilities on the PBGC about 8 years ago as a part of their Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the amount was $6.6 billion. While this is technically an insurance fund, the obligation for pension obligations abrogated by liquidating OEMs and suppliers in the case of an auto industry liquidation would have easily run into the tens of billions of dollars, rendering the fund insolvent. This would have either landed on the back of taxpayers or pension checks would have ceased for many retired Americans. The impact on the psyche of the country and on consumption in the economy can only be imagined.

In the meantime, President Obama and Governor Romney and their political parties have both been banned from GM properties until after the election. There will be no political grandstanding on bailed out automaker facilities! Imagine banning the person who represents one of your largest stockholders, without whom you would not exist.

The two automakers have also refused to furnish vehicles for the national political conventions. It’s a smart move for GM and Chrysler to stay away from politics when possible. After all, they want to sell vehicles to both Republicans and Democrats.

While things are somewhat different for Chrysler now that FIAT has bought out the Federal Government’s stake, are GM executives hedging their bets in case President Obama loses in November? While it hasn’t been talked about a lot, it has occurred to more than a few GM stockholders (myself included) what would happen if Romney is elected and immediately dumps all of the government’s stock in General Motors. This would certainly be devastating for the stock price, but what does Romney have to lose? He could claim to have relieved of GM of its Government Motors moniker, while hurting millions of private stockholders. He could blame the losses on the previous administration, and move on. If reelected, it is a given that President Obama would hold on to the GM stock, selling small amounts at a time to maintain the stock price, while hoping the improving economy would further bolster the value of the taxpayer’s stock.

It is also a given that President Obama’s role in the restructuring in the domestic auto industry gives him a serious advantage in the November election. It is hard to imagine Ohio and Michigan going Republican. And without those two states, the road to the White House becomes a near impossible journey. And if GM shareholders across the country get wind of Romney’s intent to dump the taxpayer’s GM stock at once, it could impact the way people vote in other closely contested states.

In Defense of Dealers

A few years back Michael Dell was quoted as saying he thought the auto industry should adopt elements of his “build to order” PC business model. He predicted that consumers would someday purchase new vehicles directly from the Manufacturer. Obviously, he didn’t put much value on what the Dealer adds to the Consumer / Manufacturer equation. But after making a pass at Asbury Group Mr. Dell is now a Dealer himself, having partnered with a former head of Sonic to buy dealerships. While we haven’t heard much about that venture recently, we do recall Mr. Dell’s comments about Dealers being an unnecessary and expensive link in the distribution chain. Not long after, Mr. J. D. Power made a similarly negative comment in an interview with the Wall Street Journal and was greeted with tremendous blowback. He was rumored to be a pariah at his company’s own hospitality suite at that year’s National Auto Dealer Association convention. It was not long thereafter J. D. Power and Associates came to be owned by the McGraw Hill Companies.
It seems it has become common for self appointed experts to lecture the industry on how to best retail and service new vehicles. We recall Ford Motor Company’s ill-fated attempt at being a Retailer. Ford purchased all the Ford Dealerships in a number of markets, including Tulsa and Oklahoma City. This experiment took place under the Jacque Nassar regime and provided additional evidence that manufacturers probably don’t know how to retail new vehicles profitably. Ford couldn’t make the venture work even as they owned all the Ford stores in the market! The Ford Auto Collection experiment, and the Saturn experiment at GM, didn’t burnish the concept of “One Price Selling” either. After their short and costly experiment, Ford decided it was better to sell their Dealerships back to genuine Retailers.
People outside the business typically think the secret to success in auto sales is to keep cutting the price and make it up in volume. Real Dealers know they have to make gross profit wherever they can. During their time as Dealers, Ford focused on selling new vehicles. After all, Ford is a Manufacturer. A Dealer knows that selling new vehicles is likely to be a losing proposition at times, especially Detroit 3 Dealers.
They structure their business accordingly. For that reason they learn to make up profit in their other departments. This allows them to sell new vehicles at a net loss when necessary, but still maintain overall profitability. Ford thought they could increase volume with “One Price” and regarded the pre-owned business as a necessary evil. The result? They actually achieved lower new vehicle sales at lower gross profits than before, and gave their pre-owned business away. It’s no wonder they didn’t make money!
Now the “authorities” in charge of the economy assert that GM and Chrysler would be better off with fewer Dealers, as if Dealers add significantly to a Manufacturer’s costs. This is not to say there hasn’t been significant “over-dealering”, especially in metro markets. But “over-dealering” impacts Dealer’s profitability, not the Manufacturer’s.

The Other Side
Let’s look at it from a Dealer’s perspective. Dealers these days have typically been pressured by their Manufacturers into ever more expensive and expansive facilities, despite the fact that a consumer’s Internet screen is now their “showroom” of choice. More and more consumers go to the “brick and mortar” Dealership to view inventory, acquire information, take a test drive, and perhaps get a price quote. The consumer then goes back to their PC to obtain price quotes on their desired vehicle. A Dealer’s conventional sales staff is often competing against its own Internet department, as well as other Dealers, when it comes to price! Moreover, new vehicles are pretty much a commodity these days. An excellent book on the subject is Dale Pollak’s Velocity. He points out that the new vehicle business has been an “efficient market” for years. To economists, an “efficient market” is one where both buyers and sellers have equal information and neither has any significant advantage. According to Wikipedia, “The efficient-market hypothesis states that it is impossible to consistently outperform the market by using any information that the market already knows, except through luck.” In other words, there is significant downward pressure on Dealers’ new vehicle gross profits and they are often a loss leader. Velocity is primarily about the pre-owned market, but the principles of market efficiency have applied to new vehicles even longer than to pre-owned.
The current discussion in Washington includes forcing GM and Chrysler to shed Dealers as a condition of receiving “tax payer backed” loans. For some reason, some members of Congress think getting rid of Dealers will save money for GM and Chrysler. They obviously don’t know that once established, there is very little, if any, cost to the Manufacturers for their Dealer networks. As a matter of fact, Dealers are the Manufacturer’s customers, not the buying public. The buying public is the customer of Dealers! Is it logical to try to increase sales by reducing customers?
In addition to selling new vehicles and parts to their Dealers, the Manufacturers also sell them special tools, equipment, furniture and numerous other expensive programs. The Manufacturers have transferred immense costs and risk to their Dealers. The risk of real estate, receivables, inventory and inventory financing is all born by Dealers, not by Manufacturers. In fact, a recent study commissioned by NADA stated, “Far from being a burden to the Manufacturer it represents, the Automobile Dealer supports the Manufacturer’s efforts by providing a vast distribution channel that allows for efficient flow of the Manufacturer’s product to the public at virtually no cost to the Manufacturer. The independently owned and independently financed franchised Automobile Dealer network is a critical asset to the Auto Manufacturers. U.S. Auto Dealers have $233.5 billion invested in their businesses. This capital is supplied by 20,700 independent dealerships that employ and train over 1.1 million people.” According to Dr. Michael Smitka, Professor of Economics at Washington and Lee University and an auto industry expert, “Dealer profitability based on their $233 billion dollar investment and a reasonable 8% return should equate to an 18 billion dollar return for Dealers in aggregate. We’ve seen no evidence that target has been met over the years.”
Further, Dealers provide the resources to stock inventory. They take trade-ins. They arrange financing. They collect and pay billions of dollars per year in taxes. Combined, they represent 20% of all retail sales in the U.S. Unknown to the general public, Dealers collectively have more money invested in their business than their Manufacturers have invested in theirs! Someone needs to explain to me how a Manufacturer can morally and/or legally push major investment and risk on their Dealers/Franchisees and then arbitrarily stop supplying them with product, outside of bankruptcy.
GM killed Oldsmobile by first starving it for product. What was once GM’s most profitable division received “me too,” “badge engineered” vehicles to sell, at a higher price than the same vehicle from other GM divisions. At the same time they backed these less than wonderful vehicles with a marketing campaign that stated, “It’s Not Your Father’s Oldsmobile.” This only further alienated their already aging customer base but failed to turn on younger buyers to their “me too” vehicles.
The money that should have been invested to bolster Oldsmobile was spent on a revolutionary new idea named Saturn. Saturn NEVER made money and Oldsmobile died a slow death. But at least Oldsmobile Dealers received a measure of compensation from GM. It is reported to have cost GM over a billion dollars to shed Oldsmobile, in yesterday’s dollars.

The Upside to Saturn
The best thing to come out of Roger Smith’s Saturn experiment is the Saturn Dealer network and their franchise agreement. This franchise agreement is unique in the U.S, but common in other some other countries, including Japan. It grants distribution rights for an area or region, rather than an individual market. GM has refused to allow Saturn Dealers to dual with other makes. A Dealer friend once said, “When you can’t pay the rent, you have to take in boarders!” But GM has denied this option to Saturn dealers despite the fact they haven’t provided vehicles to Saturn Dealers that the market wants in enough volume to allow its Dealers to be viable. From the beginning they were provided a line of mostly “tepid” vehicles to sell. While the recent Aura and Sky are great vehicles they haven’t been enough to save Saturn!
Besides, the Detroit 3 have never been able to consistently make money selling small vehicles. Consumers had some renewed interest in Saturn’s offerings when fuel prices spiked but that quickly waned. Imagine the result if the Detroit 3 were to design and build only smaller fuel efficient vehicles, as mandated by Congress, and the price of fuel stays low.
Nevertheless, Saturn Dealers are a resourceful bunch and have learned to survive by being excellent operators, focusing on the pre-owned and service ends of the business. They “kill their customers with kindness!” Now they have officially been notified that they will be starved for new products and will soon be phased out. Let’s hope their innovative franchise setup and professional Dealer body attracts a buyer that gives them the opportunity to represent a line of compelling vehicles, whether they be from China, India, Italy, or wherever. I wonder what might happen if Fiat decides they are better off buying Saturn instead of partnering with Chrysler? Saturn Dealers all have substantial investments in facilities that have little value if a successful automotive franchise isn’t operating in them.

Beyond Suburbia
We should also have a special appreciation for “country” Dealers. These Dealers are also resourceful and have learned how to make money in the pre-owned and service business. This has been out of necessity as they typically have not had access to any real quantity of their Manufacturer’s “hot merchandise” when their OEM produced a “winner.” Many have become dependent on their Manufacturer’s Certified Pre-Owned (CPO) offerings. Without a franchise that allows them to buy CPO caliber “program vehicles,” their futures are in doubt.
What does an Auto Dealer do for a community? Aside from local employment, local service, safety recalls, warranty repairs, local charitable work, etc., Dealers collect Sales Tax! A portion of that Sales Tax goes to local government. If a Dealer goes out of business in a community and vehicle buyers are forced to drive out of the locale to make their purchase, the local tax revenue stays where the vehicle is purchased, depriving the previous municipality of its tax revenue. This is a major issue! There are many circumstances where local government has provided financing and other support to maintain a local Dealer and its associated tax base. Imagine a municipality guaranteeing a loan for a local Dealer and the Dealer’s Manufacturer arbitrarily cancels or terminates the franchise agreement or stops supplying product. In this case the Manufacturer probably forced the Dealer to make substantial investments before shutting off product. I can hear the attorneys licking their chops.

What’s Next for the GM & Chrysler?
GM and Chrysler are between a rock and a hard place! They are afraid of Chapter 11 (re-organizational) bankruptcy. They feel few consumers will buy a vehicle from a bankrupt Manufacturer with no real assurance of warranty or resale value. If they don’t go Chapter 11, they are obligated to honor their contractual agreements, including their franchise agreements.

On a macro level, a Manufacturer bankruptcy would drop billions of dollars of pension and health care obligations on the federal government. The United Airlines bankruptcy dropped 6.6 billion dollars on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation! (read that Federal Government.) Imagine GM, Chrysler, and a slew of suppliers hitting that system at the same time. The PBGC was already 23 billion dollars in deficit BEFORE the record UAL bankruptcy. It’s no wonder the government is proving fairly easy to work with for two of the Detroit 3.

On the Bright Side
Fortunately Auto Dealers do have some “aces in the hole!” They have protection from state AND federal laws protecting Dealers and/or Franchisees from their suppliers. These laws are based on “fairness” and cannot be merely swept away by mandate from Congress, a Car Czar, or a committee. Auto Dealers have effective lobbying groups in the form of their state trade associations, Political Action Committees, and most importantly the National Auto Dealer Association. Dealers are victims of many of the circumstances that led to the demise of their Manufacturers, but Dealers had nothing to do with the melt down of the U.S. financial system that dramatically impacted them. They had nothing to do with the sudden spike in fuel prices that rendered much of their inventory “sale proof” and decimated the value of their used vehicle inventories.
Dealers don’t dictate to their Manufacturers what to design and build. Many are currently victimized by Manufacturer sales incentive programs that require the Dealer to order additional vehicles for inventory as a price of admission to the program. These programs may serve the Manufacturer’s purpose but are catastrophic to a Dealer who is sitting on a 150 days (or greater) supply of inventory.
At the same time, the same Dealer is probably facing the prospect of having to “curtail” floor planned vehicles as a result of frequently arbitrary and frivolous mandates from lenders - often the Manufacturer’s captive. This comes at a time when working capital is a most precious commodity. This practice often puts the dealer in the position of having to decline program participation and face the market with a serious cost penalty versus other Dealers selling the same brand. Many of these Dealers are already on “finance hold” due to too much inventory and/or deterioration of their balance sheet. So now they face having a serious cost penalty in selling the inventory they purchased in good faith from their Manufacturer months ago.
Many Manufacturer programs are frequently designed to give the OEM a “free float” on the Dealer’s working capital while at the same time demanding immediate payment from the Dealer for the monthly parts statement.
In summary, Dealers are not only important, but absolutely necessary to a Manufacturer’s survival and ongoing success. Shutting down an entire division may make economic sense to a Manufacturer, if they cannot afford to design and build vehicles to supply that Division’s Dealers. But it will be quite expensive to do so. Merely thinning out Dealers as a method of increasing Manufacturer profitability is a totally flawed concept and strategies designed to force Dealers out of business should be dealt with sternly.

A reprint of the Ruggles Report February 2009

Fiat to the Rescue?

Chrysler, heavily dependent on light trucks (jeeps, minivans, pickups), was whipsawed by the spike in gasoline prices in summer 2008. Then came the credit crunch; when its access to lease financing disappeared, it lost 20% of sales overnight. As cash drained, it attempted to work out a deal with its many creditors, and failed. Assuming the firm emerges from Chapter 11 – rather than collapsing into liquidation as dealers and other creditors play "chicken" in hopes of a bigger slice of a rapidly shrinking pie – what will it need to survive?
First, Chrysler has neither the cash – nor after a mass of white-collar buyouts, the people – to develop new cars. It strikes me as unlikely that it will receive an infusion of cash and the stability to rebuild its famous design and engineering capabilities. Fiat doesn't have the money. Nor does it have the people, because it has no expertise in large cars, SUVs and light trucks to supplement whatever remains of Chrysler's historically famous but leanly staffed product development organization. Chrysler thus faces a long 2 years, until new product arrives via Fiat.
It will then face the challenge of selling Fiats. The new product will consist almost entirely of small cars, because as a company firmly rooted in southern Europe and strong in Brazil and other developing markets, that is Fiat's core strength. But neither Chrysler, nor any other company operating in the US, has been able to make a go of that on a consistent basis.
On paper we have policies to encourage a domestic market for small, fuel-efficient vehicles: CAFE, or Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency requirements, in place since 1977. Under CAFE, in order to sell a large car, firms must sell small cars, or they will exceed the average "mpg" standards that legislation imposes. The problem Americans have not bought into that policy: they want power. Given separate, less stringent standards for trucks, the entire market shifted towards light trucks (which for CAFE includes jeeps and minivans, and not just pickups). Small cars remain a small slice of the market, but in 2012 Chrysler's jeeps and minivans and pickups will be dated; small cars will be the only "new" product they will have on offer.
Absent a polar shift in American politics, to enable a stiff gas tax, Chrysler will not survive to 2015.
Now in the longer haul they need to not just survive, they need to gain back at least a modicum of market share. To stay in the auto business will require the cash to continue funding new product develop. That is in itself not an insuperable barrier. But in the background firms also need to be able to fund supporting research and development so that they can bring a range of new technologies to market, particularly electric vehicles (whether they run off of batteries, small "hybrid" engines or fuel cells). At present Chrysler is wholly incapable of doing that by itself. Fiat is probably too small as well. A beefy combination of the two might be another story, particularly as a smaller company has greater leeway to buy technology from independent suppliers. (Larger companies want to withhold core technologies from larger rivals, but Fiat-Chrysler may be viewed as a way to leverage their own investment, rather than as a threat.)
That too appears unlikely. Over the past 15 years vast improvements in engineering tools -- computer design and simulation, specifically -- have enabled car companies to spin off vehicles from their core platforms more quickly and at lower cost than ever before. And the U.S. market is so large that it supports a plethora of firms -- 14 at last count. From how many varieties does a consumer need to choose a minivan? Or mid-size car? Or whatever type of vehicle? Hundreds of models are on offer. There is no reason to assume Chrysler cars will improve so markedly that they will be able to pull away from the field and secure more sales than the company does today. Or that they will make money: given the competition, profits were falling across the industry even as sales boomed. There's no reason to think they'll recover.
And no sales pitch from President Obama will change that.

Thanks to JJ and DR for the back-and-forth behind this.

Follow the Money

The news today is of efforts to cut the cost side of the OEMs, Chrysler of course but also General Motors. Is this good news? To frame that question we need to do two things. First, what of the revenue side? Second, what of the overall value stream? – after all, the OEM slice is a quarter or less of total, not including the aftermarket, consumer finance and so on. The way I read it, we do not yet have any good news, because focusing on costs while revenues slide is chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. And the upstream and downstream segments are on the brink of a deep precipice – but I'm not sure which side of the brink.

To my mind, the key variable at the moment is the residual (resale) value of a vehicle. As long as it remains low, it cuts into the arteries, and staunching the bleeding is hard. A low residual value means that purchasers are more likely to be "under water" on their current vehicle, with a trade-in value less than their loan balance. A low residual value means that leasing is dead, and a straight loan has to be priced higher, to cover the poor value of a vehicle as collateral (never mind the current recession-driven risk that the borrower's income may disappear). And a low residual value means that even if the buyer will pay cash (or has equity in their current car), they will shy away from a great vehicle in favor of one that because of its nameplate will hold its resale value. [I will post this before digging up sample numbers, say of a Toyota Titan and a comparable GM pickup – comments, please!] If the 4-year-out resale value of one vehicle is 50% of purchase price, and of another is 30% – well, no OEM can afford to discount their vehicles up front enough to offset the different.

So how to pull up residuals? Unfortunately the cutback in fleet sales at GM is too recent to have cut the flood of used cars that has depressed their residuals over the past several years. [Or so I assume -- ADESA or various used car guides could provide data.] In a year or two the impact would have been tremendous, had the recession not intervened. After all, GM has the car of the year and good ranking in the JDPowers quality surveys. (Ditto the combination of VEBA and retirees hitting age 65 to handle legacy costs on the cost side come 2011.) But luck was not with them. Maybe the biggest help the government could give is using its purchasing dollars not on new vehicles but on 2-, 3- and 4-year old vehicles to pull up their resale value.

Low residuals hurt other portions of the industry. If a dealer closes its doors, the normal franchise agreement obligates the OEM to repurchase inventory at cost. For the bank that finances this inventory ("floorplan") that is crucial. No bank is prepared to accept 200 cars on a lot when a loan forecloses. But if GM faces Chapter 11, it would no longer be obligated to make dealers (or their lenders) whole. Now if the residual value of GM vehicles was high, lenders could at least figure out what such collateral would be worth. As it is, no lender in their right mind would extend additional financing to a GM dealer (much less a Chrysler dealer). And no dealer would order a new car. That means that these companies will have zero revenue, because even if consumers flock to dealership lots, GM sells cars to dealers, not consumers.

That's of course the downstream viability story: GM may not have any dealers left, due to the collapse of financing, and they certainly won't have dealers buying cars. Costs cuts can never offset such revenue cuts. Of course if GM goes, and there is a massive firesale, Honda and others will face crisis, too, because consumers will have the choice of a new GM vehicle at 50% off – who knows? – and why in such a situation would you buy a used Honda? or a new one?

Now the upstream parts sector is in as bad of shape, maybe worse. While GM is closed they will be ordering no parts (remember that the factories of parts firms employ about 3x the number of manufacturing jobs at GM and its peers). With no orders, no revenue. Now the strategic imperative for suppliers the past decade was to diversify their customer base. But how can they keep their factories open if Honda and Toyota are 25% of their revenue, and GM and Chrysler 75%? And how can they fund the engineering effort on new vehicle models and basic R&D needed to garner orders for vehicles launched in 2012 and 2013, when sales will hopefully have rebounded? I don't think they can. My own feeling is that the downward spiral is not letting up. The tide is still building, and the whirlpool is getting harder to escape.

So, even if a bailout is arranged that temporarily keeps GM out of bankruptcy, if the downstream and upstream both collapse, well. I want to avoid thinking about what that might look like, and how the industry could start up again. But my quick attempt to follow the money suggests it's flowing down the drain, and the flow is slowing to boot.

thanks to DR and JJH and TK for stimulation

I will try to add numbers later

Back to the Beginnings

Well, today came the first steps towards the de facto reorganization of GM without going through the de jure process of bankruptcy court. The game has switched from softball to hardball ... squash. No more finesse, whoever has the most power wins. It's not GM's bondholders and it's not the UAW. But it may be the collapsing economy that proves the most powerful, not the Obama administration.

Arguing that issue will take time -- my outline is 5 single-spaced pages, not the sort of thing for which a blog is suited. Instead let's do a little applied IO (industrial organization), beginning about a century back. The auto industry evolved in a manner familiar from that perspective, at least in its stages if not the overall process.

After the formative years of playing with multiple technical standards and marketing strategies, as well as corporate structures, Henry Ford latched onto a combination that worked. He assembled parts and sold his Model T to dealers, collecting money up front, and paid suppliers in arrears. Vanadium steel alloys and ultimately the moving assembly line enabled him to push down the weight of his car, and up the speed of assembly. Inventory turns, all that -- though since the old man hated accountants, there are no books to trace the financial evolution of the firm. In any case, he soon dominated the market, in the US, in Europe, in Asia.

Now Henry owned the firm, or at least he did after forcing out the other shareholders, something he'd done twice before in the forerunners to the Ford Motor Company. (He was not a nice man.) No one could dissuade him from his policy of ever-lower prices as he improved the basic model and (for many years running) lowered his costs. But there was a bottom to how low he could push costs, and others began attacking his position from upmarket. GM succeeded, and the Model T began a gradual decline, until in 1926 Ford was forced to pull it from the market while he rushed the development of the Model A. By the time he launched it in 1927, Chrysler had also emerged as a player. Monopoly power made Henry insensitive to the shifting market, and the lack of outside shareholders meant there was no restraint on his whims. Ford was free to give away market share; if he wanted to bankrupt his firm, that was his business.

Fast forward 50 years for a variation on that story, to which I will provide another spin. From the early 1950s into the early 1970s GM was the dominant firm in the US auto industry (and with the exception of Japan, number one or two in the markets that mattered outside the US). For twenty years running it was the most profitable manufacturer (and often the most profitable firm) in the world, earning a 20% return on assets. But with just over 50% of the US market, antitrust considerations constrained additional expansion; it had to allow Ford and Chrysler a share of the market. Through price leadership it could nevertheless coordinate pricing policy with them; its economies of scale were considerable, and it was the low cost producer. The other two firms thus wanted to avoid a price war; though they could set prices below GM's umbrella, they could not be unduly aggressive.

Eventually such high profits did encourage new entry. Via imports the Scandinavians had a modest presence, as for a while did British, Italian and French firms. Of course there was also American Motors, an amalgam of US firms that emerged -- or rather merged -- after WWII. More successful was the German firm VW, particularly when a fad for small cars swept the US in the late 1960s, making the Beetle a hit. But as had happened in the late 1950s, the small car fad passed and the market for that low-profit segment shrank. Detroit was relieved, because if they all entered, it would have been a bloodbath: flooding the market with low-margin products was not an attractive business proposition. When there was another swing towards small cars in the late 1970s, following the first and especially the second oil crisis, VW stumbled and it was Japanese firms that captured the small car market. Again, the Detroit Three wisely sat on the sidelines. But US government policy worked against GM and the others. Ronald Reagan's VER ["voluntary" export restraint] policy effectively asked the Japanese government to organize a cartel to raise prices in the US. Carter's CAFE [corporate average fuel economy] standard and the earlier Clean Air Act bolstered the position of these new entrants, because they favored small cars and imports. The profits of the VER and the breathing space of other policies gave the Japanese time to build a distribution network and to move upmarket. We know the rest of the story.

Back to substance: over the next quarter century GM steadily ceded market share to these and other entrants. (At present 14 firms assemble vehicles inside NAFTA -- ignoring equity ties, two are Korean, three German, three are Detroit-based, and six are Japanese.) Doing so was rational. GM could have lowered profits to preserve share. But why should it do so when it was so dominant? The modest increment garnered by the new entrants was no more than a burr on its side, and shareholders would rightly have screamed if it gave up its bounteous profits that it earned on its 50% share of the market in an effort to scare off these entrants. Henry Ford was irrational in his strategy. But GM was rational in its refusal to fight. Making way for fringe firms to enter the market is the only sensible strategy for a dominant firm.

Eventually a dominant firm thus will cease to be dominant. So it was with GM, though it hung onto the most profitable segment, light trucks, and did well thereby. That would be the end of the story if downsizing was easy in the auto industry. Even then it might not have mattered had GM not had to shoulder pensions and especially healthcare obligations for its increasing numbers of retirees. Such aspects must await another post.

Let me reiterate the central point. GM's management certainly made many mistakes. This included such bone-headed investments as Saturn, billions spent on automation and other hoped-for "magic bullets" that ignored basic operational competence, and an overarching role for people with a background in finance rather than manufacturing, engineering or marketing. Nevertheless its core strategy was consistent with earning high levels of profits for its shareholders. Indeed, it was sufficiently successful in this that going into the current recession it was Toyota that was mimicking GM in its strategy in North America, rather than the other way around. Another year or two of breathing room would have made all the difference.