Maryann Keller - Recent Speech at a JD Power Conference

For the over four decades I’ve been involved with the auto industry, first as an investment analyst and now as a consultant and director serving on the boards of both automotive companies and auto dealers. Over those four decades, I’ve heard many arguments made against the franchise dealer system…which dealers never fail to disprove time and time again.

One myth promulgated in the 1990s - and now resurfaced by Tesla - is that factory stores save money by reducing distribution expenses wrongly estimated at 30% of total expense. Let’s put aside for the moment that the percentage itself is nonsense, Ford’s ill-fated Auto Collection experiment proved conclusively (as told to me by a former Ford executive last week) that corporate guys are not risk takers and lack the entrepreneurial spirit to manage dealerships. Big corporations control from the top but selling cars requires street smarts and adapting to local market and competition. Ford ended its experiment after a couple of years of market share losses amid mounting evidence that factory stores do not deliver a better customer experience nor reduce costs, in fact they proved to be bad at both. GM, perhaps after watching Ford’s travails, and despite repeating the same nonsense about reduced costs through factory ownership, canceled its plans to buy 10% of its dealers, plus the Saturn stores, and operate them in through what it called GM Retail Holdings.

Ford’s failed experiment demonstrated that, franchise laws notwithstanding, dealers are essential partners in the long process of a car’s journey from the factory to a customer’s garage. Franchise laws protect dealers from arbitrary actions by automakers and given the financial commitments they continue to make in response to factory demands in image programs, equipment, training and even vendor selection, the laws are entirely reasonable. Given the intense competition in auto retailing, it’s hard to understand how anyone could suggest that franchise laws hurt consumers.

Franchise dealers’ cumulative investment in land, equipment and facilities easily exceeds $100 billion. Dealers fund 60 days of inventory and another month of inventory in transit that would otherwise fall to the carmaker. The inventory buffer allows automakers to adjust future production levels. For a company like Ford US inventory funding equals about $15 billion at any point in time.

Tesla may be the first start up to launch a car and change the retail process as well but it is definitely not the only company that saw dealerships as a costly impediment to customer bliss. A few years ago I was involved with one such company funded by venture capitalists, and led by a non-automotive executive, that invested in a small car promising to build to order sold though mall-based stores. The car never made it to production and the company folded after consuming the investors’ capital. .

Despite evidence to the contrary and lacking any real world understanding to the business, a journalist writing on Yahoo Autos last year stated “Instead of building cars and selling them to dealers who hawk them to shoppers, Tesla wants to build only cars to customers orders, eliminating part of the auto industry’s massive overhead costs in inventory. By selling cars directly Tesla’s executives believe they can make their customer happy, and eventually sell more cars for less money.” Well we will see if it is fact is more economical for the factory to pay the rent, salaries, delivery and service or have someone else do it using his or her own capital. And build to order works only as long as there is an order bank…what happens when the orders dry up…do you send the assembly workers home, tell your suppliers to send to stop producing until you call?…..unfortunately auto assembly really doesn’t lend itself to build to order. It is capital and labor intensive even when work is farmed out to suppliers.

Every dealer knows that the vast majority of customers want their car that day not a date convenient to a manufacturer. The dealer has always been the buffer with the automaker facilitating inventory management through various incentives and production adjustments. It is the dealer who finds the market-clearing price for a vehicle even at the sacrifice of his or her profits.

Others have tried experiments in selling away from the traditional retail dealer location on the notion that a big box retailer or mall would mitigate advertising expenses by placing cars where the customers are.

Early in the 2000s, Asbury struck a deal with Walmart to sell used cars in the parking lots of Walmart stores. Asbury would take the cars to where the retail customers were at America’s busiest retailer. A few dealers have experimented (as Tesla is now doing) renting inline space in large shopping malls as storefronts to sell cars. So far, the history of non-dealership settings to sell cars – with perhaps the exception of the infrequent offsite tent sale – hasn’t worked. The Asbury/Walmart experiment ended in less than two years when both parties discovered there were too few car buyers among the static population of regular customers who shopped for food and other necessities at their local Walmart each week.

I suspect that once the novelty associated with Tesla wears off, it too will also discover that mall locations aren’t ideal places to market or sell cars. The enclosed shopping mall typically has several large anchor stores – Nordstrom, Macy’s, Neiman Marcus, etc. – and perhaps eighty to one hundred or so “in line” shops like GAP, the Limited, Zale’s, Sunglass Hut, Apple, etc. A large successful mall might have more than a million or more visitors a year – and that’s about 3,000 folks per day. Those big numbers can dazzle but they aren't what they seem. Much of this traffic represents repeat visitors, as it did at Walmart, coming each week or so to see the changing merchandise at her favorite stores – new fashion and seasonal clothing, makeup, shoes or the latest Apple gadget. Everything can be purchased on a credit card. I used the pronoun “her” deliberately because the vast majority of mall stores are dedicated to women and children not the men who would be the targets for an expensive, high tech performance car.

Furthermore, new car models are only really new only every four to six years. The merchandise doesn’t change very often – so on the second or third visit to the mall, the car store looks exactly as it did last month or even the month before. What was fresh once is now stale with the passage of time…so visitors to the mall just skip past that new car display.

What the uninformed forget – or figure out after an attempt or three – is that automotive retailing is very different from traditional retailing. The product car dealers sell is expensive, generally requires financing, and often involves a trade. It often includes helping shoppers match their budget to a car that might not be their first choice but rather one they can afford. The process is slowed by required disclosures and regulations resulting in a pile of documents that have to be signed even for the most straightforward transaction.

A car weighs 4,000 pounds and takes up 50 square feet of space. It can’t be delivered overnight to one’s front door by Fedex. And most folks don’t have a big enough credit limit on their Visa card to pay for it. And what do they do with their trade? Or get it serviced?

While we are talking about myths, how about the still repeated one that people hate dealers so, if given the chance, they will buy a car online. I almost don't know where to start in taking this one apart…..In the early days of the Internet, Silicon Valley funded and lost hundreds of millions, maybe even a billion dollars, on ill-fated ventures that promised to do just that. CarOrder.com, Greenlight.com, and CarsDirect.com (in its original configuration), among others, all promised to avoid the dealership experience. A few actually did that by buying cars from dealers and then reselling them at lower prices to customers until they blew through their capital. Build to Order.com proposed that you would place your order for a fully customized car while lounging in a company-owned showroom entertainment center. Again here the premise was to build these cars using an automaker’s parts and technology but avoiding high labor costs and dealerships and give the customer the exact car they wanted. Build-to-order.com never built anything for anyone.

In 1999 and 2000, I ran priceline.com’s experiment with selling cars online, which like most others of the era no longer exists. The essential elements of the priceline model were replicated by TrueCar.com and of course they too ran afoul of franchise laws for the same reasons as priceline. What I learned then – and this is still true today – we could connect buyers with dealers and that the price of a vehicle was the easiest part of a deal. The other elements are harder to control and often the cause of frustration for the customer and the dealer. People don’t like to hear that their trade isn’t worth the value they saw online or that their poor credit doesn’t qualify them for the no down payment, zero percent loan. There are few people who would think about buying a house online from a few photos taken make rooms seem larger than they are or the neighbors Beware of dog sign. Buying a car is comparable to buying a house, why should we think it should be as easy as buying a pair of shoes from Zappos with a return receipt in the box in case they don’t fit.

Although many automotive websites claim to have “sold” millions cars, even today twelve years after priceline decided to concentrate exclusively on travel, automotive websites link a buyer to a dealer who actually sells the car. The Internet has mostly replaced the newspaper as a source of information about cars and dealers but it has not reduced advertising expense per vehicle or made buying a car as easy as buying a book.

Add up all the monthly traffic to all automotive sites, including automakers, dealers and independent sites – and you’d get more than 100 million possibly close to 200 million unique visitors using the web to get information about buying or selling a new or used car. Except there’s one problem if this traffic is somehow suppose to represent potential sales…the total number of new and used cars sold by dealers at retail and excluding fleet each month is only about two million units, and that is probably generous given that not all retail customers go online..some might just release the same brand of the leased car they are returning to the dealer. So the real shoppers – however you want to define that number – are only a small fraction of the total visitors. So just like newspaper, radio, or TV advertising, dealer spend on the internet is likely no better targeted – once again dispelling the notion that the internet would solve the age-old problem of knowing which 50% of a dealer’s advertising works.

And what was once promised as to the beauty of the Internet for used cars…listings of available cars with pictures, even videos, and stated pricing would make it easy for shoppers to find the best car at the best price. But what has happened is that for any given vehicle, within a similar bandwidth of age, mileage, trim, the price range for specific models is usually within a few hundred dollars, not enough to make price the deciding purchase factor. The Internet hasn’t created a pricing advantage for any seller and customers simply have confirmation that similar cars within a market are priced the same. With the exception of hard to find cars, the differentiating factors are having the car the customer wants, proximity of the dealership and the dealer’s reputation in providing a good customer experience.

In summary, technology is a wonderful thing…and dealers have adopted it nearly full tilt. Sophisticated software to manage every aspect of the business is now de riguer…BDC’s to support internet sales…and eDocuments will eventually become the norm. But the point is that the system of franchised dealers – using their own risk capital to fund their businesses and guarantee millions of dollars of inventory, promote their own brand and that of their OEM, provide the expensive tools needed in their service departments, and manage the endless headache of a workforce – will not be superseded by technology or factory owned mall stores. Factories have learned that they cannot do a better job than independent businessmen at the retail level. And new start ups – many of whom will come and go – with new systems of selling and servicing retail automobiles will all reach the same conclusion: the dealer network is the best way. Thank you for listening today.

Economics 244: The Auto Industry

I begin teaching a 4-week-long auto industry seminar today; David Ruggles, this site's co-blogger, visits at the end of the week. For the syllabus etc go to the Econ 244 course web site http://econ244.academic.wlu.edu. I do not yet have detailed course readings, but will post my own economist's guide to the industry over the next 2-3 days.     ...mike smitka...

Dealers Push Back

Emboldened by recent healthy profits and the prospects of a recovering economy, auto manufacturers are pressuring their surviving dealers, at least the ones that have survived arbitrary terminations and recession, to upgrade their facilities. This, at a time when Dealers are desperately trying to repair their balance sheets and reconstruct relationships with their bankers after a bloody few years of just trying to “hang on.” Dealers have enough problems dealing with recalcitrant banks just to maintain reasonable floor plan lines and capital loans without having to ask for facility renovation money. Perhaps after a few years of recovery and bolstering their balance sheets, Dealers might be in a better position to entertain the idea of facility upgrades. And for the ones who can get financing or have cash, does it or will it make economic sense given current trends?

Manufacturer’s demands and requests are often supported by “focus groups” where consumers are asked what value they put on a dealers facility. Everyone seems to like a nice clean facility. Let’s face it, shiny granite, marble and wood DO make an impression. So do boutique expresso bars, nail salons, shoe shine stations, and other “foo-foo” features. The problem is, as much as consumers like these things, a growing number aren’t willing to pay for them. The consumer thinks the value of their business is the 35K they just paid for a new vehicle, not the $2k the Dealer retains out of which they pay their expenses.

Increasingly, consumers care less and les about fancy facilities as their PC and monitor tend to be their showroom of choice. While a facility on a high traffic piece of property might bring consumers in to take a sales person’s time to answer questions and take a demo drive, the negotiation is much more likely to take place “on line” these days. This IS the “new normal.” This is where high overhead becomes a disadvantage. As one consumer said to a Dealer friend, “I can’t drive your overhead, why would I want to pay for it?” This same Dealer, who shall remain nameless, is being pushed by his manufacturer to erect an elaborate sign to replace the one that existed when that manufacture terminated his franchise. Having regained his franchise through arbitration the OEM just can’t understand that the old sign was “grand fathered” and the new one has to meet CURRENT city code. The sign is a small part in a major push to “encourage” the Dealer to invest more in an already impressive facility. But this is just another day in the life of a dealer.

Dale Pollak, chairman of vAuto, is right when he wrote in a recent article that there is no need for dealers to do warranty and repair work on a high dollar piece of property. Is the added convenience worth the extra overhead?

The retail auto business is trending in such a direction that Dealers need to be more conscious of overhead costs than ever before. Manufacturers need to “get a clue.” If their Dealer can’t compete because of unnecessarily high overhead mandated by the manufacturer, it becomes increasingly difficult to find another investor Dealer for that point.

And as the Internet provides a more efficient market for each new generation of consumers, high cost facilities become even more of an albatross. In other words, expect the current trend away from “in showroom” negotiation to “online” negotiation to accelerate.

Manufacturers and some Dealers seem to ignoring a demographic fact. Consumers my age tend to put a lot of value on relationships, proximity, and convenience. But younger consumers are different. They have never known life without the Internet. They feel empowered by it. They are much more likely to use the “Taj Mahal,” high overhead dealer for information and service and warranty work, but to use the Internet for negotiation. They will travel for the cheapest price. I wish this weren’t so, but it is what it is.

As such, we’re in virgin territory in the retail auto industry. The new “book” is still being written. Manufacturers cling to commonly held dogma, as do many Dealers. But the future will only be loosely based on old models. The day is coming when Dealers will have to bid for a consumer’s business on line!

The pre-owned business will most likely increase in relative profit importance in tomorrow’s dealership. Warranty income will probably continue to dwindle due to the increased quality of vehicles. Financing and after market income is under the scrutiny of Elizabeth Warren and federal bureaucrats.

The future will belong to those Dealers who are prepared for it, and not encumbered by yesterday’s standards.

So when the manufacturer comes calling Dealers may need to learn how to, “Just say NO!”

Written by David Ruggles for Auto Finance News

"Turning Oil Into Salt" book review.

Book Review of "Turning Oil into Salt," a book by Gal Luft and Anne Korin

If you believe in global warming, you believe we need to get off of fossil fuel. If you believe we need to reduce the strategic value of oil, it is a somewhat different calculation. People get these issues confused. Reducing our dependence on fossil fuel is generally considered the province of "Green Liberals," "Al Gore Disciples," "Tree Huggers," "Global Warming Alarmists," etc. That isn’t totally true as evidenced by the video at made by unlikely partners, Newt Gingrich and Nancy Pelosi.

But reducing the strategic value of oil is something everyone should be able to agree on, even for those who are skeptical that a global warming hazard even exists. The following video was made by ex CIA head James Woolsey: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3mWeyREivdk

So why are you reading this in an auto publication? Because according to Gal Luft and Anne Korin, the authors of "Turning Oil Into Salt," MORE government intervention into the auto industry is required to reach a solution. Many of us are rolling our eyes at even the thought, but the stakes couldn't be higher. "We ARE engaged in a war against fundamentalist Islam, and we ARE paying for both sides of the war," say the authors.

Today, roughly two-thirds of the world's oil is used for transportation, and most vehicles are able to run on nothing but. Oil's strategic status stems from it=s virtual monopoly over fuel for transportation, which underlies the global economy and our way of life. To understand the implication of an over dependence on a strategic commodity we can look at history. At one time, salt had a virtual monopoly on food preservation. Wars were fought over salt. Finally, Napoleon, who's army "traveled on it's stomach," had had enough and offered a significant sum of money to the person to eliminate his army's reliance on salt. Within a few years, a French chef invented food "canning." After canning, electricity, and refrigeration, salt has lost its strategic status and we no longer go to war over salt.

How can this be accomplished with oil? According to Luft and Korin it only requires Congress to mandate that from a specific date forward, all or most vehicles sold in the U.S. must be manufactured as Aflex fuel@ vehicles, capable of running on gasoline and/or a variety of alcohols and blends. This has already been done in Brazil where 80% of new vehicles purchased in 2008 were flex fuel. The additional cost to produce a flex fuel vehicle is about $100., which includes the cost of premium fuel system components, a fuel sensor and computer chip reprogramming. The first Model T Fords ran on gasoline OR alcohol. There are a variety of alcohol fuels available. Alcohol does not mean just ethanol, and ethanol does not mean just corn, a particularly bad fuel feed stock. Other alcohol based fuels include methanol made from coal and ethanol from almost anything. And speaking of coal, Germany fueled its WW2 war effort with diesel fuel made from coal. A lot of this technology is old, having been rendered unnecessary when we had cheap oil spurting out of the ground.

According to the authors the average vehicle in the U.S. is in service for 16.7 years. Once 15% - 20% of the total vehicles on the road are flex fuel, the market will take over. Refueling infrastructure will develop and additional alcohol production will come to market with coal/methanol probably eclipsing corn as a feed stock, much to the chagrin of Midwestern farmers and Senator Charles Grassley.

Add in additional vehicles operating on compressed natural gas and electricity, plus additional conservation based on increased fuel efficiency “encouraged" by CAFE, and dependency on oil could be reduced 35% in 10 years, the exact amount we import from OPEC. We would also be less dependent on oil in general and all of our oil could be sourced from North America, including Mexico and Canada. There is even a "Drill Baby Drill" component to the Luft/Korin plan, although the U.S. has some disadvantages. It costs OPEC less than a dollar per barrel to lift their oil from the ground, while it costs us almost $10. They have about 78% of the world=s known reserves, but only produce 40% of the world's supply, as they work to maximize the price of each barrel they sell. OPEC produces less now than they did in 1973, despite having more cartel members.

In the meantime, we have less than 5% of known reserves but consume 25% of the world's production. And the lower the American price at the pump, they more we consume and the more pressure we put on the world market price of oil to rise. Unfortunately, we don=t get a discount for our volume purchases.

A bill called the "Open Fuel Standard" (OFS) is pending before both the House and the Senate. Of course, it has been pending for months. The bill ensures that 50% of new vehicles sold in the U.S. with an internal combustion engine would be warranted to run on gasoline, ethanol, or methanol. Diesel vehicles would also be warranted to run on bio-diesel.

In 2009 there were no fewer than 33 Make/Models warranted to run on up to 85% ethanol, but no warranty for methanol. Expanding this to more models and including blends of methanol should be easy. Brazil has done it and at one time, auto manufacturers and oil companies in this country considered using methanol as an octane booster, but chose lead instead.

There are currently 8 million flex fuel vehicles on the road out of 200 million total vehicles but we have not yet reached the critical mass necessary for the market to respond with refueling infrastructure and additional investment in alcohol production. In light of the increased price of fuel at the pump, the Open Fuel Standard bill needs to be rapidly advanced while the issue of high fuel prices is fresh in people’s minds.

Some say the expansion of alcohol fuels and the OFS bill is being held hostage by agribusiness lobbying efforts. along that same line, for some reason, we place a 54 cent per gallon tariff on imported Brazilian sugar cane ethanol. A barrel of oil is 42 gallons. You can do the math. Brazil can produce rivers of sugar cane sourced ethanol. Wouldn’t we prefer to buy ethanol from Brazil than Oil for OPEC? It would certainly decrease our reliance on oil, but corn farmers and Midwestern politicians object.

"Turning Oil into Salt" is must reading for auto industry professionals. And it's a quick read, making it's points in only 138 pages.

David Ruggles, written for WARD's Dealer Business

Book Review of “All the Devils are Here
The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis”

“Hell is empty and all the devils are here” - William Shakespeare - The Tempest

This brilliantly written book should be required reading for any registered voter in the USA. With all the misinformation “out there” about who and/or what caused the financial crisis, it is important to know where to go for answers. This book is “The Source.” The authors are Bethany McLean and Joseph Nocera. McLean was co author of the highly regarded book on the Enron crisis, “The Smartest Guys in the Room.” Nocera is an acclaimed financial writer for the New York Times. The authors’ mission is to tell the story accurately and honestly with no particular political agenda, to explain the complex in a way that can be understood by those not steeped in Wall Street “speak,” and to provide insight into the personalities and characteristics of the major players. The level of research evident in the book indicates to me that the authors were already well connected before they began their research for the book.

Why is the issue of the financial system meltdown important to those who follow the auto industry, and other sectors of the economy? In the late 1970's, consumption represented about 60% of the total economy. 30 years later, consumption was up to about 70%, despite the fact that the income of the middle class had remained stagnant during that time span. How did this occur? The additional consumption funding came from credit fueled primarily by “securitization.” Wall Street’s version of “securitization” had been invented and had grown to 40% of the total credit market by 2008. This expansion of credit fueled economic growth. When the mortgage backed securities market collapsed, it took down the entire securitization market including, credit cards, student loans, commercial loans, auto loans, dealer floor plan, and many other forms of credit. Losing a major portion of available auto credit and funding for dealer floor plan and working capital, pushed already shaky auto manufacturers over the brink, as auto sales slid and dealers dropped like flies. The resulting vicious cycle took the economy downward into recession. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was all that stood between the economy and a major depression.

“Securitization” was the process that “allowed mortgages to be converted into a “bond” by combining numerous mortgages into one huge financial instrument. First, Wall Street invented “tranching” to divide up the securities into segments, typically three, based on the inherent risk each tranche entailed. This protected the highest risk level tranch from loss by paying off defaults from the lower rated tranches first. The next step was to devise “derivative” contracts to “insure” the risk. Based on derivative “insurance” like credit default swaps, Wall Street was now able to convince regulators that it was not necessary to “reserve capital” as a hedge against default claims. Now, if only they could get these securities rated AAA by rating agencies like Fitch and Moody, Wall Street nirvana could be achieved. Now junk could be sold around the world as high yield AAA rated securities. AAA is the rating equal to the rating of Treasury bills. To say the least, billions of dollars were made, huge bonuses paid, and many innocent people bilked.

Guarantors of risk were not required to have the money to make good if their bets didn’t pay off. Yet, traditional depository banks were still required to reserve capital, as had been the norm ongoing. This rendered traditional banks to be uncompetitive UNLES they sold their own mortgage originations to Wall Street. If a depository bank originated a mortgage, it could sell that mortgage to Wall Street, buy it back as a part of a AAA rated security, and avoid the “capital reserve requirement. Rating agencies like Fitch and Moody were paid by the Wall Street banks whose products they rated.

Junk mortgages could be assembled into a MBS (Mortgaged Backed Security), tranched into 3 segments based on “risk,” “insured” with a Credit Default Swap contract where no capital reservation was required (it was assumed that Wall Street would not take risks not in their own interests), obtain a AAA rating to represent the securities’ safety as the highest grade, which allowed them to be purchased by entities limited to AAA investments by law, like pension funds, and sold around the world . Profits were privatized on Wall Street as huge profits were made and mind boggling bonuses paid to executives. The risk, however, was socialized to U.S. taxpayers.

The U.S. government, in the form of the George W. Bush administration and it’s Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, was put into the position of allowing the world financial system to collapse or step in with TARP. Fortunately, Congress approved TARP, which despite its imperfections, saved the world from an incomprehensible disaster. After all, it was the U.S. government’s lack of oversight that stood by and let it happen in the first place. Other countries were looking to the Americans as their own economies were severely impacted by the actions of American investment bankers.

Governments are generally expected to protect it’s citizens from avoidable disasters. The Republican Party found this out after the Great Depression. Democrats paid a price after Jimmie Carter. Even President Barack Obama has been blamed by some despite the fact he had nothing to do with the disaster, other than casting some votes while a Senator. Unfortunately, many voters lack the ability to grasp complex issues, and fall prey to simplistic explanations.

In 1979, the Wall Street version of securitization was invented and launched by Merrill Lynch. Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) in the form of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, etc., had securitized the first mortgages in previous years. The GSEs were given objectives of how many low down payment low income loans they should make at a minimum by Congress. The compensation packages of the executives of the GSEs were predicated on these objectives. Interestingly, the GSEs were already making these types of loans at a much higher rate than the objectives they were given, making huge bonuses a given. Further, the GSEs received credit just for purchasing AAA MBSs containing them from Wall Street. The GSEs thought that was safer than holding the paper themselves. In fact, Wall Street had rendered the GSEs superfluous.

Wall Street was allowed to create a “betting market” on almost anything. The problem was not so much deregulation, but a refusal to regulate at all. During the period of time Wall Street was “rocking and rolling” American home ownership increased only 1.7%. Yes, we have paid a terrible price for such a small increase in the percentage of those who get to experience the American dream. Yes, mortgage originators “approved” huge numbers of loans with little chance of them being paid back. And they did this because they were never going to hold the paper anyway, just as an auto dealer sells auto loans to his/her banks. It was all being sold to Wall Street because they could take the lousy paper, turn in into AAA rated securities, and sell it to anyone. But the real problem was with home refinances and home equity lines of credit.

So who caused the meltdown and who were the players? In 2008, I wrote that the meltdown was caused by an “unholy alignment between liberal and conservative political causes.” This was after watching hours of testimony on CSPAN and studying the subject intensely. After two years of additional study, including watching Hank Paulson, the Bush Treasury Secretary and author of TARP, testify before Congress under oath, I have adjusted my thinking. But my own personal opinion is not important. All of us have to satisfy ourselves. For those who want to believe the meltdown of the financial system was caused by the overly altruistic “holding a gun” on lenders, forcing them to make loans they knew would never be paid back, you will be disappointed. It’s a non issue.

Some major “players,” their roles, and some resources are listed as follows:

“All the Devils are Here,” Nocera and Mclean

“On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System,” By Henry Paulson”

The last chapter of Bush speech writer David Frum’s recent book: “Comeback: Conservatism That Can Win Again”

“Overhauled” by Steve Rattner

George W. Bush speech on American home ownership from 2002

http://autosandeconomics.blogspot.com/

George W. Bush - consciously worked to prevent anything from slowling the housing juggernaut that was fueling the economy. He also had the guts to stand up to his own party’s ideologues to move to save the economy from destruction by proposing and passing TARP along with his Treasury Secretary. Moved against Congress to bail out GM and Chrysler by using TARP funds after Congress had turned down a bailout package.

Alan Greenspan - a disciple of Ayn Rand, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, fought regulation of derivatives at every turn

Larry Summers - under the Clinton administration was an opponent of regulating derivatives. Teamed with Robert Rubin to squelch Brooksey Born’s bid to regulate derivatives. At the time, Born was Chairperson of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission. As a member of Barack Obama’s administration, Summers was a key player in the bailout of GM and Chrysler, and the direction of many TARP funds.

Robert Rubin - Treasury Secretary under Bill Clinton - worked to quell efforts to regulate derivatives

Brooksey Born - Chairman of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission - moved to regulate derivatives, and was squelched by Rubin and Summers.

J P Morgan - invented the credit default swap by paying the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to assume it’s risk in their exposure to Exxon, which tapped 4.9 billion of it’s 5 billion dollar credit line after it’s notorious oil spill disaster. It never occurred to anyone to ensure the EBRD had the funds to make good in the case of a default. It turns out it didn’t make any difference. Years later, the were many claims to be paid and only the U.S. taxpayer to pay them.

Moodys, Standard and Poor, and Fitch Rating - Were paid by the same companies who’s products they were supposed to rate. Enabled Wall Street to sell junk as AAA level investments.

The Three Amigos - Lewis Ranieri - Salomon Brothers bond trader - “I wasn’t out to invent the biggest floating craps game of all time, but that’s what happened.” David Maxwell - CEO of Fannie Mae, formed an uneasy alliance with Ranieri and Wall Street. Larry Fink - After creating some of the first mortgage backed securities he later served as a key government advisor.

Blythe Masters - helped invent the credit default swap for J P Morgan

Joe Cassanno - Ran the Financial Products division for American Insurance Group (AIG) - Began selling credit default swaps (CDS) on collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) “Collateral triggers” built into AIG CDSs helped bring the company down.

Phil and Wendy Gramm - As Senator and later as Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, Phil blocked attempts at regulation at every turn. Wendy Gramm, a PHD economist, was installed as Chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) by Geroge H W Bush when it’s current Chairman, Mark Brickell, was moving to regulate derivatives. The move stopped the move to regulate in its tracks.

Roland Arnall - Appointed to the post of Ambassador to the Netherlands by George W Bush while his company, Ameriquest, a major sub prime mortgage “lender,” was a leader in blatantly deceptive lending practices. At one point, a group of ex auto business F&I managers operated a consulting company, specializing in showing fledgling mortgage brokers how to falsify and manipulate documents. They went so far as to have a web site devoted to creating phoney pay stubs, tax returns, job letters, etc. In fact, Wall Street wasn’t really concerned about documentation, as they were able to turn lousy mortgages into AAA rated investments under most circumstances.

President Barack Obama - Was duped and gave Arnall a pass during Senate questioning regarding Arnall’s ambassadorship because a mutual friend, Deval Patrick, the current Governor of Massachusetts, sat on the Ameriquest Board of Directors. His administration inherited the economy in a dreadful condition, although without the strong and decisive action of George W Bush, Hank Paulson at Treasury, and Ben Bernanke at the Federal Reserve Bank, things would have been much worse.

These are only a few of the personalities and characters involved. Before a reader allows themselves to be intimidated by the prospect of not understanding everything in the book, please understand that the people perpetrating these evils on the world didn’t fully understand what they were doing themselves. People don’t usually buy books about business for entertainment purposes, but I couldn’t put this one down. It read like a riveting“who dunnit.” Don’t pass up the opportunity!

Ruggles

Bob Lutz – “The Triumph of “Gut” over Number Crunching”

Bob Lutz, auto industry icon, recently received a Lifetime Achievement Award from the Automotive Fleet and Leasing Association (AFLA) at their annual conference in Las Vegas. As part of the ceremony Mr. Lutz was asked for his opinions on recent events in the automotive industry, as well his perspective on his career in the auto industry. Not only has Lutz had a brilliant career in the auto industry, his ability to articulate is what sets him apart.

Lutz has written another book, to be released next year. His previous book, “Guts: 8 Laws of Business from One of the Most Innovative Business Leaders of Our Time” is well known and widely read. While I like my own title for his book, he prefers “The Car Guy Versus the Bean Counters.” I’m sure it will be an instant best seller.
Lutz’s long adversarial relationship with the numbers people goes way back. In my own view, bean counters live by the mantra, “You can’t manage what you can’t measure.” They have no understanding for the fact that, “What you could have had, but didn’t get” is just as real, despite the fact it can’t be easily quantified. For years, Lutz has had to deal with those who thought designing and building vehicles should be based on study group data. The previous generation Malibu was an example. According to Lutz, GM’s numbers people maintained that that Malibu scored the highest in study groups of any vehicle they had ever developed. We know how that car worked out. Thanks to Lutz, GM now takes a different view in the development of their vehicles. By investing an additional $500. to $800. per vehicle in content, with a focus on interior quality, transaction prices are higher as fewer and lower incentives are required to maintain volume. The current Buick LaCrosse is an example.

Lutz points out that GM is not in the transportation business, but in the business of emotions. Consumers buy vehicles mostly based on how they view themselves driving it, and how they are perceived by others.

On the subject of Buick, Lutz addressed the issue of why GM chose to maintain the Buick brand instead of others they let go. Buick is a hot brand in China. Over time, Chinese became impressed with the Buick brand because it was the chauffeur driven vehicle of choice of the wealthy and high ranking officials going back decades. In fact, Chinese preferred Buick to Cadillac. This preference made the Buick brand the obvious choice when the decision had to be made.

Lutz is highly critical of the U.S. government’s CAFE approach to fuel economy, preferring the European model of fuel taxes. His comment, “CAFE is like trying to control American obesity by only producing standard sized clothing,” brought down the house. In his view, phased in fuel taxes would influence consumers in what they buy and drive, making it easier for manufacturers to predict consumer preferences. The fact that this is not politically viable is another story. Lutz believes that U.S. consumers will not pay a premium for high fuel economy vehicles without a dramatic rise in fuel prices, despite the fact he raves about the new GM VOLT. At some point Americans will tire of fighting the war against radical Islam and paying for both sides of the war.

When questioned about any possible political ambitions Lutz replied, “First of all, I’m too old. Secondly, I wasn’t born in the U.S., and we know how that plays in this country. But should those things be waived, I might agree to be Emperor for a couple of years.” Extreme laughter followed this “tongue in cheek” comment.
When the subject of the auto industry bailout came up, “Lutz first responded by saying, “I really don’t have anything in common with the average Democratic voter.” Again laughter. But he went on to say, “The administration’s team did an admirable job. There is no doubt they had to trample on some due process issues, but the end result was magnificent.” While I would have loved to have been able to ask questions about SIGTARP, the dealer terminations, the executive shuffling at GM, the impending IPO, etc., there wasn’t an opportunity.

Lutz kept his audience spellbound and there was a discernible wave of disappointment when it was time for his segment to conclude.
Going into his version of retirement he has left a lasting legacy on the auto business. Bob Lutz is at the top of my list of those I would most like to have a beer with.

David Ruggles
WARDS Dealer Business
Sept 2010

Inside The Chrysler Dealer Arbitrations

The Chrysler dealer arbitrations have been completed. Out of 108 arbitration hearings Chrysler maintains they won 76 of the decisions to 32 in their favor of terminated dealers. 32 out of the 789 franchises initially rejected have now received a “Letter of Intent,” which still makes th dealer subject to the nefarious whims of Chrysler when it comes to re-establishing their business. Word has it that Chrysler has employed unscrupulous tactics with their jilted dealers, leading to their overwhelming won/loss ratio.
On the heels of the final Chrysler arbitration numbers comes the Special Investigator General Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) report. This is the government’s own audit of the use of TARP funds to bailout Chrysler and GM. The report castigates the Auto Task Force, led by Ron Bloom, Steve Rattner, and Steve Girsky for forcing the terminations. It seems the Task Force wanted to impose the “Toyota Throughput Model” ON GM and Chrysler. The OEMs might not have had any choice in cutting down their franchise count. After all Rick Wagoner was fired for not submitting an aggressive enough restructuring plan after taking TARP money from the Bush administration in December 2008. There isn’t enough space to analyze SIGTARP here. Others have already done so and the document speaks for itself. There is no doubt it would have been quite helpful to dealers locked in arbitration with their OEMs, had it been available at the time.
How Chrysler, in particular, went about their termination process is telling. Chrysler aggressively pursued arbitration, probably at the behest of CEO Sergio Marchionne, who thinks the dealers work for him. GM, on the other hand, wasn’t as aggressive as new CEO Ed Whitacre quickly figured out who his customers are and worked to restore many dealers quickly.
We talked to Carl Woodward, CPA of Woodward and Associates, Inc. Mr. Woodward has 38 years experience specializing in auto business accounting serving hundreds of auto dealers. He also has actual dealer experience as a partner/owner. Mr. Woodard participated in about twenty dealer arbitration cases on behalf of dealers. We have also spoken with dealers, some who won and some who lost their Chrysler arbitration hearings. A common theme arose from these conversations. Many of the Chrysler terminations made no sense at all. They were made based on incorrect data, incorrect interpretation of data, and quite possibly out of retribution toward dealers who had stood up for themselves in the past.
Chrysler typically fought against motions to transcribe arbitration proceedings. It seems they routinely took advantage of the lack of auto business and financial experience of some of the arbitration judges. Chrysler must not have wanted a record to be available when they took different sides of an issue depending on who the arbitration judge happened to be. For example, Chrysler might take a position that LIFO counts as working capital if that argument works in their favor, supporting a dealer they retained over one who was terminated. In another situation they might argue that LIFO reserve does NOT count as working capital if that argument supported the termination of a dealer. If the arbitration judge didn’t know the difference, and the dealer wasn’t knowledgeable and well prepared, this worked out in favor of Chrysler. As a practical matter, LIFO reserve DOES count as working capital. Chrysler must not have wanted a record to be available. Why have to deal with precedent if it is inconvenient?
In at least one instance, Chrysler retained a dealer with negative working capital over one with many times Chrysler’s own guide formula. Chrysler got caught on it when the dealer was well prepared with a knowledgeable attorney and CPA experienced in these matters.
In my own case, I have been in and around the auto business for 40 years. Until recently I have NEVER heard from any manufacturer any assertion that fewer dealers sell more vehicles. A spot check of Chrysler’s Alpha – Genesis project revealed interesting results. The project involves consolidating all of the Chrysler – Jeep - Dodge – Dodge Truck franchises under one roof. Imagine a market that has a 3 dealerships, one for Chrysler, Dodge/Dodge Truck, and Jeep. Now you put them all in one location. Yes, it’s probably good for the dealer who ends up with the 4 franchises under one roof, unless he/she had to boost overhead substantially to accomplish it. But I have yet to find an instance where overall Chrysler market share increases under this circumstance. My research is admittedly anecdotal. But others I have spoken to, including Carl Woodward and various dealers, are telling me the same thing. Even a couple of “factory people” have made the same observation without agreeing to attribution. When challenged in arbitration hearings to prove that Alpha – Genesis has been proven to achieve the stronger market penetration Chrysler says it desperately needs, they have, to my knowledge, not been able to provide any data to support their assertion. Might their entire premise to terminate dealers be based on a false premise?
Tammy Darvish, co-leader of the Committee to Restore Dealer Rights and vice president of Darcars Automotive Group in Silver Spring, MD weighed in: "It is curious that there is no accountability for the gross error in judgment on behalf of the Auto Task Force in addition to those that we believe committed perjury in Federal Bankruptcy court and in Congressional Hearings. Raising your right hand and swearing to tell the truth, the whole truth and then doing everything else but is unconscionable."
There is no doubt that it has been better for the economy to have a relatively orderly restructuring of GM and Chrysler instead of a disorderly liquidation. But the motives and tactics of Chrysler, in particular, are repugnant at best.
Addenda: We bloggers on Marketplace July 19, 2010

Conspiracy Theory and Push Marketing

After the taxpayers took ownership in General Motors and Chrysler there have been a couple of interesting conspiracy theories take arise. The first was the assertion that the Democratic administration singled out Republican dealers for termination. I haven’t heard much about that one recently. It might have been because it was determined that the majority of auto dealers self identified as Republicans in the first place. The second was the assertion that the government had sat on information that Toyota had experienced a raft of sudden acceleration occurrences and had only brought it to light recently to give the domestic manufacturers, including the two owned by taxpayers, the opportunity to gain ground on the industry leader. Talk show host Michael Savage seems to be the only one talking about that these days.

Toyota hasn’t taken their problems lying down and has launched the most aggressive incentives in their history in an effort to stem their recent loss of market share and volume. Their sales results were up 41% from March 2009. Toyota’s incentives, valued by Edmunds.com, averaged $2,256 per vehicle. This represents a record high for Toyota.

In an effort to keep pace the other OEMs, including the Detroit 3, have also launched aggressive incentives of their own. These “push marketing” strategies include some dramatically sub vented leases which include residuals that most likely won’t “come true” at lease end. This practice allows an OEM to avoid a large up front rebate that immediately comes off the corporate books in its entirety, in exchange for a real number dictated by whatever the market dictates at lease termination down the road. While OEMs may set up some reserves in anticipation of future losses, it is quite likely the end result is that current quarterly results will look better than they should.

As GM is aiming for an Initial Public Offering this year to buy out the taxpayers, there may be some additional motivation to shape current quarterly results.

In the case of Ford, the UAW is selling a large block of Ford stock to fund it’s VEBA (Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association). Ford intends to sell additional stock this year to produce cash to reduce their debt load. This dilution of Ford stock could reduce it’s stock price, which is considered to be fully valued in the range of $12.00 to $13.00 per share. Showing healthy profits now, while gambling on a minimal loss down the road in an attempt to maintain the current stock price, might also be a part of Ford’s strategy. Ford is promoting extremely aggressive short term leases, in particular on select Lincoln models.

In the meantime, Chrysler is just trying to maintain whatever market share they can until they can bring new products to market.

The industry was up 24% over March 2009. Before the exultation begins, let’s recall how horrible March 2009 was. But the news from March 2010 was mostly favorable. But the bottom line is the results were largely incentive driven. Are we back to full bore “push marketing?” The upshot? Downward pressure on the value of late model pre-owned vehicles which impacts consumers who own them, rental car companies, and fleets. Brand image suffers. And it becomes increasingly likely that the projected residuals will fall short of projections.

“Push marketing” sells new vehicles, produces lots of tax revenue, and creates jobs. OEMs might add over time to their schedules, put on additional shifts, and/or call back laid off workers. If GM and Chrysler launch even more aggressive incentives it might spur the other OEMs, especially the ones who manufacture in the U.S., to follow suit. There might even be a reopening of shuttered assembly plants. The impact would ripple through the supplier base. States and municipalities would welcome the additional sales tax revenue. And the administration could show a decrease in that bothersome unemployment statistic in an election year. That's my conspiracy theory.

The D3 has shed enough cost through the Chapter 11 bankruptcies, and subsequent concessions to Ford, that they can actually make money at aggressive rates of incentives.

The long term incentive situation is further fueled by the fact that OEMs, in particular the ones partially owned by taxpayers, have made a major commitment to smaller more fuel efficient vehicles. The near term CAFÉ requirements will mean aggressive incentives on those vehicles if consumers don’t buy them in large numbers in the face of steady fuel prices.
We have mostly been on the incentive drugs since Joe Garagiola hooked us in 1975. Given the fact that the government could, in theory, "encourage" GM and Chrysler to return to even more aggressive “push marketing,” what are the chances?
Or will the Toyota recall situation, which fueled the current round of aggressive incentives, die down and allow the industry to let normal demand dictate production and sales, protecting the value of consumer’s vehicles?

written by David Ruggles for Auto Finance News

Perspectives from NADA Orlando 2010

My first NADA convention was 1987, after the record setting 1986 model year. I recall two things in particular. First, the shrimp and crab claws were of extraordinary size. The shrimp in Orlando this year were particularly puny and the crab claws were conspicuously absent. Second, Maryann Keller’s workshop was so over sold that attendees, including myself, stood down the hall just to hear her words. In my mind, she was and still is the preeminent auto analyst around. I recall her stating that in 1986 Toyota made more money on the investment of its cash portfolio than GM made on its’ entire world wide operations. This was a revelation at the time and began to put the international auto in perspective for me. A lot has happened since 1987.
By my best “seat of the pants guesstimate,” Orlando 2010 was about one third the size of “normal” years. I dread the thought of this being the new normal. NADA artfully arranged things to make the convention seem busier than it actually was. But GM had pulled out of the expo and economics kept many vendors away. As there are thousands fewer dealers after the recent bloodletting, and thousands of others are hanging on for dear life, there were a lot fewer attendees. Those who were in attendance seemed to be in good spirits.
There were some excellent workshops this year. Keller was not there but Dale Pollak, Jim Ziegler, and Joe Verde were standing room only as usual. As a consequence, I chose not to take up space in their workshops as I have seen them before. So I attended workshops by Andrew Iorgulescu from OpenLane, Amanda Savage from Manheim, and Lee Harkins from M5 Management.
Iorgulesco and Savage both commented on the fact that the premium units in terms of mileage and color are increasingly being sold “upstream” and never see the brick and mortar auction. As a consequence, the physical auctions are seeing a higher percentage of “dregs” in their consignments. There is a new generation operating dealerships these days. This generation has never known life without television, computers, video games, and cell phones. They are much more likely to be using the Internet to buy inventory than those my age. I expect the trend to increase.
Lee Harkins blew me away with his comprehensive and insightful presentation on Internet marketing for Fixed Operations. His insight on the new reality of how the Internet drives our business was amazing. Were I still a dealer I would say that attending Harkins’ workshop was many times more valuable than the investment to attend the convention. Kudos to NADA for excellent workshops!
Ed Tonkin took over the chairmanship of NADA for the coming year, taking over from John McEleney. I have known John for about 25 years when I was his competitor in Clinton, Iowa. He is truly a knowledgeable and honorable man. What a year to have been NADA chairman. I’m sure he has had his detractors over the last months, but it is easy to be a Monday morning quarterback. NADA wasn’t in a great bargaining position when things “hit the fan.” I expect incoming chairman Ed Tonkin to be more of a “fire breather” if he is anything like his father Ron, NADA chairman from 1989. Dealers need a tough and aggressive advocate! Tonkin inherits an interesting situation. Terminated dealers are no longer NADA members if they no longer have a new vehicle franchise. Yet, they may be embroiled in the reinstatement process through arbitration. A reinstated dealer might compete with a dealer who was not terminated. This puts NADA and Mr. Tonkin in a tough position.
In the meantime, GM CEO Ed Whitacre seemingly embraces the thought of reinstating as many as a thousand dealers. But Steve Girsky, perceived by many as being the father of the dealer terminations when he was a member of the government auto task force, has just been named to the GM board of directors. It will be interesting to see how this all works out.
DealerTrack and RouteOne had great parties. But there was nary a crab claw in sight.

Written for Auto Finance News

David Ruggles is a former dealer-owner and consultant with nearly 40 years’ experience in the auto industry. He has conducted an annual seminar on auto dealership issues and processes in Japan since 1993, and helped develop specialty software focused on pre-owned leasing. A contributing columnist for Wards Dealer Business and Auto Finance News. Member of the International Motor Press Association. He can be reached at ruggles@msn.com.

It’s Unanimous!

Pre-Owned values will continue to rise as supply shrinks.

Early 2010 pronouncements by industry experts bear out what economists close to the industry have been predicting since the fall of 2008. With consumers keeping their present vehicles longer, and fleets and rentals putting off or reducing purchases, there are fewer vehicles coming back into the pre-owned market. In addition, the lack of leasing in the last 18 – 24 months means there are thousands fewer lease returns available. Add it all up, and the industry is looking at an extreme pre-owned shortage.
Edmunds.com analysts project that “the used-vehicle price strength of 2009 — caused largely by low inventory levels and healthy demand — will likely continue into 2010 thanks to "tight" supply and sustained demand.”
According to NADA, “about 8 million fewer used cars and trucks entered the U.S. market over the past two years, resulting in higher used-vehicle prices every month in 2009.” NADA is alone in expecting the pre-owned shortage to ease somewhat in 2010, predicting an additional 1 million vehicles traded in to dealerships in 2010 because of higher new vehicle volume. In my mind, this increase is not enough to make up for the loss of Cash for Clunker vehicles and the absence of tens of thousands of “off lease” and rental vehicles. If financing becomes available and fleet and daily rental companies replace large numbers of vehicles, there could be additional pre-owned inventory available. However, these will be much higher mileage units than ever before for each category due to the fact they have been kept in service so much longer than in previous years.
OpenLane predicts strong demand will drive wholesale market throughout 2010. “Reduction in trade-ins and overall sluggish new-vehicle market will be the primary wholesale demand drivers.”
ADESA's Tom Kontos has indicated that wholesale prices should continue to show "stable-to-firming" trends in the near future, saying that "although auction inventories are rising a bit — mostly from returns of off-rental units that normally occur earlier in the fall — supplies remain tight." Kontos’ conclusion? "Coupled with improving vehicle demand, this should keep wholesale prices in a stable-to-firming pattern through year-end and into 2010."
Ricky Beggs, Vice President and Managing Editor of Black Book, says, “Used vehicle values in 2009 showed mostly strength, and when looking at year-over-year levels showed some huge gains, even when the vehicles had significantly more miles on them.
Some of the same circumstances that helped used vehicles maintain their strength in values are still present and are part of the equation for 2010 and beyond. Due to much lower levels of new vehicle sales for the past two years, the number of used cars in the market place is greatly reduced. Daily rental units being turned in are also at lower levels, and are expected to be similar to the 2009 numbers.”
Eric Ibara, Director of Residual Value Consulting for Kelly Blue Book says, “While tightening supply will undoubtedly impact used car prices over the next few years, its effect will not be uniform or consistent throughout all segments and at all times. Some segments will benefit more from the reduction in daily rental volume. Obviously, manufacturers scaled back on fleet and lease volume to varying degrees, and the impact on their models will be in proportion to their actions. Late-model used car prices are also subject to new-vehicle transaction prices, but with the downturn in auto sales, many manufacturers took out production capacity, sometimes on a permanent basis. To this end, there should be less downward pressure coming from high new-car incentives, but again, the effect will vary from segment to segment and by brand.”
RVI Group predicts a “4 year pre-owned price climb.” For those who don’t know, RVI stands for Residual Value Insurance. These folks put their money where their mouth is as they guarantee virtually all insured residual values in the country. According to Rene Abdalah, Vice President of RVI Group, "We expect the year-over-year upswing in used prices to reach a peak of 13-percent in 2012 before starting to stabilize.”
What does all this mean? The sky is not the limit on pre-owned values. The MSRP and transaction price of a like model new vehicle places somewhat of a cap on pre-owned values. Lower OEM rebates and incentives could provide room for pre-owned prices to move even higher. The higher values caused by the shortage might somewhat improve consumers’ equity or negative equity positions in their current vehicles. But the biggest issue is supply.
I’m with RVI on this one. The shortage won’t be over in a matter of months. It will be years before we reach stability. Even if there is a supply of available pre-owned vehicles, the quantity with reasonable miles will be few. What can a dealer do?
If the dealer is a Ford Lincoln Mercury dealer, the OEM is helping out. The recent 27 month leases offered means dealers will have a supply of lease returns coming soon. If ever the market needed “Half-a-Car” and short- term principles it is now if only to supply pre-owned vehicles through lease returns. Eustace Wolfington, where are you? Wolfington and “Half-a-Car” proved the short-term theory back in the late 1980s and into the 90’s in an era where there was no pre-owned inventory shortage. If anything, this era was marked by over production of new vehicles and over saturation of rental and other program units by the OEMs, something they have vowed to eschew this time around.
Dealers who don’t have access to short-term residual based financing through their OEM should look to local credit unions. There are hundreds of credit unions across the country offering residual based financing and/or leasing.
Savvy dealers understand that the monthly payment drops $35. - $50. per month for every thousand dollars of trade equity or money down on a short-term lease or balloon. This means using the rebate or dealer incentive on a short-term lease or balloon, in lieu of a subvented long-term interest rate offers, can offer a surprisingly low monthly payment. If the consumer has additional down payment and/or trade equity, the payment/profit balance gets even better. Everybody wins and the dealer has a shot at the off lease vehicle at the end of term, as well as the opportunity to do business with the buyer again.
The pre-owned inventory shortage will be with us for a while. Why not take some measures to mitigate its impact on your business?


by David Ruggles
Written for Auto Finance News, January 2010

Rattner's "Tell All"

I have been trying to resolve a mystery for months. When it was announced that General Motors and Chrysler were terminating dealers as a part of restructuring through bankruptcy, I smelled a rat. So did many who have been around the auto business for a while. Historically it has been a practice of auto manufacturers to add sales points as a method of driving volume and market share. Were we expected to think they no longer cherish these objectives? In a complete turnaround from their histories, they asserted that closing dealerships saved money for the manufacturer. The mystery? Whose idea was it? Who imposed it? I have speculated that it was forced on GM and Chrysler by the government’s Automotive Task Force in its zeal to impose a “Toyota Throughput” model. Both the manufacturers and the Auto Task Force blame the other for the dealer terminations.

Part of the answer came at the recent Auto Finance Summit held in Las Vegas at Red Rock Hotel and Casino. One of the high points was an address to attendees by Rick Wade, a member of the Automotive Task Force. During his address, he never specifically mentioned the decision to cut dealers, but his tone indicated that he thought everyone figured that dealer terminations were necessary to make GM and Chrysler viable. He came across as an enthusiastic, bright, and well-intentioned person who was placed in a position, with the other members of the Task Force, where important decisions had to be made quickly. He was quite pleased, as am I, that GM and Chrysler have been, at least temporarily, “saved.” Before being called to serve, Wade was certainly an auto industry outsider, for better or for worse.

But the real bombshell has been Steve Rattner’s recent article in Fortune magazine, where he reveals all sorts of interesting inside information. Rattner is the now-resigned head of the Automotive Task Force during the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies, the real “car czar.” Some of the information he reveals probably should have stayed “inside” for a while out of common courtesy and discretion. In particular, he shares his personal views on GM management, and Rick Wagoner in particular, in a particularly caustic manner. He reveals the content of private conversations. In his tell-all piece he also acknowledges the challenge of dealing with the N.Y. attorney general’s investigation of his former firm, Quadrangle, while simultaneously heading up the “Team Auto,” as they called themselves. He freely admits that he and his fellow task force members knew little of the auto business.

It is true Team Auto had no real precedent to rely on and faced a critical time schedule. It made me wonder why he was selected to the post in the first place. He must not be expecting to be considered for any important positions in the future as it is unlikely that anyone would speak candidly to him knowing his penchant for being less than discreet.

The Bush administration had “bridged” GM and Chrysler over to the Obama administration with an injection of $17.4 billion in TARP funds in late December 2008. The decision to use a Section 363 bankruptcy strategy to accomplish a quick “cleansing” of liabilities through Chapter 11 has at least temporarily saved the two companies and hundreds of thousands of jobs. For this, I commend Rattner and Team Auto. If things go as planned, GM will IPO in the next couple years and buy out the government’s stock holdings. Chrysler’s situation is much more fragile and depends on Fiat more than anyone should be comfortable with. But GM and Chrysler were saved at a time when their liquidation could have touched off a catastrophic chain of events in the auto industry and the overall economy.

So what about my mystery? Who made the decision to terminate dealers? I’m not talking about shutting down Pontiac and Saturn or selling Saab and Hummer. A business case can be made to support these decisions. I’m talking about decimating the Cadillac dealer network and terminating thousands of viable GM franchises across the country. I’m talking about terminating 789 Chrysler, Dodge, and Jeep franchises.

There was a recent article in Automotive News on Jim Press, Chrysler’s now discredited and terminated co-president, which itemizes many apparent contradictions in Press’ career. I distinctly recall Press and GM CEO Fritz Henderson during the Senate committee hearings itemizing the “savings” they would realize by terminating dealers. I didn’t hear anything that smacked of the truth. It is now disclosed that Press had his own private reservations about terminating dealers. Mark LaNeve, the recently deposed head of GM sales, has stated publicly that he is worried about GM’s lack of dealer coverage and its negative impact on sales and market penetration. He expressed concern about GM making orphans of 900,000 GM owners. Then there is the quote from Joe Eberhardt, Chrysler Group’s past senior vice president for sales and marketing: “When a company loses a dealer, its overhead costs stay the same and — at least in the short term — it loses a few hundred car sales. There's no immediate payback." Carl Woodward, a longtime CPA serving auto dealers, also disputes any claims of net savings to auto manufacturers by terminating dealers. In his 6,000-word article for Fortune, Rattner took no credit for the dealer terminations. I wonder why.

published in Auto Finance News

How Do You Measure Quality in the Auto Business?

Am I presumptuous enough to lecture J.D. Power on how to measure quality? Not really. My point is that there is more than one way to calculate vehicle quality. General Motors and Ford are sporting some gaudy J. D. Power rankings these days. Some of their products are ranked as equal to the leading imports. I’m sorry to have to leave Chrysler out of this discussion. It is anyone’s guess where Chrysler’s future quality numbers will end up, given that many important decisions are being made by Fiat. Fiat’s hallmark has not been quality in the past and many dealers, including myself, still have a bitter taste in their mouth from Fiat’s last foray into the U.S. market. But Chrysler/Fiat will be a subject for another day.
So what might be a better measure of quality than J.D. Power and other quality surveys? I submit that resale value is the most important measure of quality as perceived by consumers and the market in general. Quality is more than fit and finish. Quality includes how well an OEM’s vehicles hold their customer’s money together. In this regard Honda and Toyota have set the mark. Other than their traditionally high fit, finish, and NVH (Noise, Vibration, and Harshness) achievements, they have eschewed large volume fleet sales. They have also disdained direct to consumer rebates. As a consequence, their CPO (Certified Pre-Owned) programs serve to strengthen their strong resale values whereas the Domestics are desperately trying to rehabilitate themselves. Consumers do not appreciate the OEM, with whom they just did business, undermining the value of their new vehicle. They might appreciate the rebate they just received that helped motivate them to buy, but they certainly resent waking up one day and discovering they are thousands of dollars “upside down” in their recently purchased vehicles. Many owners of Domestic vehicles don’t find out how bad their financial situation is when they try to trade their vehicle 36 months or sooner into their finance contract. There is no doubt the resale value issue has a strong impact on whether a consumer is a repeat buyer frm an OEM.

Ubiquity is the Enemy of Cachet
So how do Toyota Camry and Honda Accord, two of the best selling vehicles in the U.S. auto market, maintain their cachet in the face of their large sales volumes? In my mind, its boils down to the fact that you rarely see those vehicles in fleet and rental service. In addition, you don’t see consumer rebates advertised. Just as I was becoming sold on the J. D. Power rating on the Chevy Malibu and the good things said about the car in the press, I observed a couple hundred Malibus decked out as taxis at McCarran Airport here in Las Vegas. At the taxi cab pick up station there was Malibu after Malibu rolling up to pick up passengers. It left a bad taste in my mouth. While there are many Toyotas and Hondas coming back into the market as pre-owned vehicles, they are mostly three year old lease turn ins and natural trade ins, whereas there is a much higher number of Domestics recycling in a year or less. Many of these are daily rental turn ins. This, coupled with direct to consumer rebates outweighs any J. D. Power quality ratings in the mind of consumers..

Resale Value, Residuals, and Leasing
Leasing is in the news again. GM and Chrysler have both announced recently they will re-enter leasing. I still can’t get used to the idea that Chrysler finances and leases through GMAC. Chrysler has been out of leasing since last July when lenders forced them to give up leasing as a condition of granting essential financing. GM’s lack of capital and huge residual losses forced GM to scale back leasing last fall. GM will be leasing through U.S. Bank in 5 northeastern states. Other OEMs have continued to lease through their captive finance arms and independent banks. GM and Chrysler have lost substantial market share as a consequence of their not being in the leasing business for the last months.
What is the lure of leasing to an OEM? They can offer lower monthly payments for shorter terms and achieve a higher degree of repeat business through leasing. In addition, there are depreciation credits available as the title of a lease vehicle is held in the name of the OEM. These depreciation credits come in handy if the OEM is profitable. In addition, trade equity and cash down payment lowers the monthly payment a lot more on short term lease contracts than on long term finance contracts. Cycling the consumer more often leads to increased market share when your competition can’t compete. Lower resale value (residuals) means it costs Domestics to subvent their residuals and money factors to be competitive with Toyota and Honda.
And now we see Ford is pushing their new world class Taurus, bi turbo, direct injection, AWD, etc. as a police cruiser. They already devalued the name Taurus in past years by making it the most common fleet vehicle in history. It appears Detroit has not learned their lesson.

Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics!

David Ruggles
See also Cliff Banks article in Wards

As I watched the Senate hearings today on CSPAN my blood boiled. When asked about the money they would save by cutting their dealer count these guys, Henderson (GM) and Press (Chrysler), engaged in some serious obfuscation. They asserted that by swapping an "under performing" dealer for a "performing dealer" they would pick up the gross profit of the additional sales of the new "performing" dealer. These calculations of the difference between what they got and what they felt they were entitled to makes up the bulk of what they claim the rejected dealers "cost" their companies.
I have a little experience in this area. I have operated dealerships in a number of markets. As a consultant I have visited hundreds of dealerships and worked closely with them. The best dealers are those who have structured their business in such a way as to be less vulnerable to the inevitable downturn in either the new vehicle market or the times when the offerings of their manufacturer weren't well accepted in the market. These successful dealers learned to develop their pre-owned business and other profit centers, and they probably brought in other manufacturer makes to help cover their fixed costs in the event of a market downturn.
These dealers are typically still profitable, despite our difficult sales environment. These are precisely the type of dealers targeted by Chrysler and GM.
Markets are not created equal. To understand the concept, think in terms of MSR, which stands for Minimum Sales Responsibility in the Chrysler business. GM has its own terminology, but the same meaning. MSR is where a manufacturer's national market share percentage is applied to the total new vehicle volume in a specific dealer's market. Any deficiency – shortfall from the target – is what a manufacturer views as lost sales. They can calculate the gross profit they would have made had the dealer hit its MSR. But now they appear to count it as a cost in justifying the arbitrary termination of dealers and their employees. There are additional assumptions. The gross profit they calculate is the margin they make when they sell the a new vehicle to the dealer. The dealer has to sell it at retail to make money themselves, which isn't always possible. MSR also varies by locality; it is certainly possible that a dealer who exceeds MSR in one market would underperform in another.
The fact is, Chrysler and GM resent dealers who have managed their business in such a way as to not be overly dependent on selling their products. Many rejected dealers have been targeted as a result of their business acumen. In addition, Chrysler and GM are moving to force more expense onto their retained dealers. GM has sent out "participation agreements" that any dealer wanting to go forward must sign. It effectively replaces the franchise agreement, forcing dealers to agree to do anything and everything, or else. Don't sign, and the dealer is terminated. GM and Chrysler want more elaborate and expensive facilities. The also want exclusivity in those expanded facilities, meaning the manufacturers won't allow competitive makes in these facilities, even though they are purchased or leased by the dealer, NOT the manufacturer.
Normally, dealers would be protected from these types of unreasonable demands by state and federal franchise laws. But GM and Chrysler are taking advantage of their bankruptcies to avoid these restraints. They are showing why these laws existed in the first place - there is a long history of franchisors abusing franchisees, once the franchisee has money in the business that they can't extract. The auto industry isn't unique, but each store represents a far larger investment than in fast food or most other franchising. Congress and the states had made such blackmail illegal; now Chapter 11 is being manipulated to allow it.
I have a friend who had a Chrysler-Jeep operation yanked from one store, and a Dodge operation from another. Now Chrysler can give them to a competitor. These yanked franchises didn't fall out of the sky, good money was paid for them. Chrysler wants to exact a 3 million dollar building from the other dealer in return for being granting it the franchises. The dealer who was NOT terminated was not selling near their MSR, so there must be other motivations. It will be poetic justice if the yanked Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge franchises languish for lack of a party willing to invest that much for a new facility. Time will tell.
According to Chrysler's Press the distribution costs per vehicle amount to about $1000. Of course, each vehicle bears its proportion of these costs regardless of which dealer they were shipped to. In Press' argument this cost would be less if they could replace under performing dealers with (fewer) performing dealers. But these costs aren't related to the number of dealers – they represent the money spent to develop and maintain the software in the first place.
Furthermore, neither executive mentioned the costs their companies have transferred to the dealer. While claiming there were substantial costs associated with the software and hardware related to their dealer communication IT package, Press neglected to mention that each dealer is charged about $2600 a month for this. He failed to mention that there really are very few, if any, field people these days, as dealer contacts are made by email and telephone instead of actual in-store visits. There was a concerted effort to overstate costs and avoid altogether any mention of how much of these costs are actually reimbursed by dealers. In fact, studies show that each dealer represents POSITIVE cash flow BEFORE they buy a vehicle or a part!
I've been frustrated by previously not being able to determine who made the decision to cut dealers, rather than to allow natural attrition to thin out dealer ranks. (That attrition rate is high at present!) It is hard to believe that Henderson and Press have that little understanding of the auto business. I have to conclude that the initiative to lower the dealer count is driven by the Task Force, who think Toyota's business model is what everyone should emulate. The Task Force may be made up of restructuring geniuses, but they have little understanding of the auto business. Their profession means they are mostly North Easterners who may not even own a vehicle, and are not oriented to the issues of smaller businesses. But when a dealer closes, it likely results in a bankruptcy in which a family's life savings are wiped out. It's not just a job loss. The Task Force doesn't seem to understand this. Closing dealerships will cost sales for Chrysler and GM, something they can ill afford. And the ill-will it generates will cost them a lot more than any potential savings.
Imagine Gillette volunteering to give up shelf space space at the super market to Schick! It's the same principle. Foreign competitors looking to expand their dealer base will scan the ranks of rejected GM and Chrysler dealers. If not for the recession, that would save many of the terminated dealers.
In the meantime the "task force" is driving the bus while all parties deny any micro managing by the government.
But remember: as bad is it is, it's better than liquidation! Those who think Chapter 11 for GM and Chrysler should have been declared last summer have forgotten the financial crisis. To operate in Chapter 11 still requires financing, and for almost a year now that has only been available from the US Treasury. The Task Force is necessary, but the specialized nature of their skill set is apparent. The faster these two firms exit Chapter 11 and the Task Force stops calling the shots, the better.

Dealerships are a Cost? - I Don't Think So!

Mike Smitka

The statements of the CEOs of GM and Chrysler at today's Senate hearing on dealership closures make very little sense overall. (For details, see the National Automobile Dealers Association website. Full details should be on the website of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation.) It is true that some dealers run shoddy operations that hurt the brand in the communities where they operate; that is a problem in any franchise system. Current state franchising laws make it very difficult for "the factory" to yank the franchise of such dealers. Well and good if those are the dealerships being targeted – but there is no evidence that is the case. Are there that many bad apples in the GM dealership barrel? I don't think so.
The only GM statement that had any numbers in it refered to incentives paid to dealers and sales people, along with training, advertising and other support, at an average of $1,000 per vehicle.* For GM to save money, they have to cut that number a lot. Is there a lot of fat to be cut?
I don't think so. Here's why.
So let's say GM trims the number of dealers. IT and the like are fixed costs, independent of the number of dealers – though generally dealers get charged for software, brochures, everything. There are thus big savings only if the incentives are trimmed. So the bottom line is that for consolidation to save GM money, the productivity of sales staff and the dealership as a whole has to increase. With 20% of dealerships being cut, each sales person has to sell 25% more (= 1/.8), because for this to make sense the dealership can't add personnel or other costs. All while the dealership is earning significantly less for each car they sell. Is that realistic? I don't think so.
With fewer sales points, GM will somehow have to attract more customers, a lot more customers, to each physical location. They've failed at that in the past two decades. Are GM products so hot now and henceforth that they can get by with fewer locations? I don't think so.
OK, so GM wants newer dealerships, sometimes in new locations, so that volume per dealership can increase. But if I'm making less per vehicle because GM has just cut the wholesale discount, why would I want to do that? Not unless I'm making so much money that I can be coerced by GM into handing more over to them. If I were the banker for such a dealership, how would I react? They want me to lend them a lot of money to build a new dealership in a down market under a marketing plan that intends to cut the margins that dealers earn? Would I as a banker lend them the money to do it? I don't think so.
And hasn't GM ever heard of the internet, customers shopping online, test driving here and there, but coming to a dealership only to sign the paperwork? Does a fancy store add value in the new retailing world? Carpet reeking of mildew is one thing, I've been in dealerships like that, and walked out. But will fancy brick and mortar make me more likely to say "yes" to a harried salesperson? I don't think so.
Finally, what of Certified Preowned Vehicles? GM needs to sell those – especially once leasing starts to increase and rental car companies renew their now-aging fleets. "Underperforming" dealers are still in business because they were doing something right. Looking only at new vehicles is narrow-sighted. Are the fewer number of urban megastores going to let GM move that metal? I don't think so.
One possibility is that this is coming from the Administration's automotive team. They've proven to be brilliant workout specialists, getting the potentially viable portion of Chrysler through Chapter 11 in a manner the bankruptcy lawyers I've talked to thought impossible. Is that skill set likely to suit them to understanding the complexities of franchising, particularly franchising in the multiproduct context of a car dealer? (Dealers have at least 5 business lines, new, used, service, parts sales, finance & insurance brokering, and often a body shop.) Probably not. This lack of understanding may be further muddied by a comparison of dealer averages between Toyota and GM. That assumes that Toyota does well because of its dealerships, rather than the other way around: Toyota's dealers do well because Toyota's market share has steadily risen, ahead of their dealer count. But Toyota's attempt to sell full-sized pickups has flopped, because they don't have all those small, rural dealers who at GM sell their most profitable product. See David Ruggle's post below on The Task Force. He's actually seen restructuring first hand, and knows more of the specialized skills that entails.
Let me hazard a guess, [after consulting with a friend, almost surely wrong] that the incentive system for GM's factory reps focuses on the number of new cars they sell. For them, an "underperforming" dealer makes them look bad, there's no way they can match the bonus of a rival who drew "better" dealers. The smarter dealers watch the mix of used and new vehicles, and if they can snap up preowned on the cheap at auction and make more money, they'll shift their emphasis in that direction. But the reps who handle the certified preowned side of the business, well, they're kept in the back room, out of sight. Management doesn't see their success. [Again, GM was the one to launch the CPO business, and it's built into their rep system, so that doing well on CPOs was a positive, not a negative to reps.] But that means GM will be cutting their smarter dealers, the ones with the best business skills and feel for the market. Does that make good business sense? I don't think so.
* CEO Fritz Henderson: "GM pays about $1,000 a vehicle for dealer and salesperson incentives, advertising, field sales, service and training, and information technology support, he said." Automotive News. There was no breakdown or support for this $1,000 figure. GM does not have anything to say about salespeople and their compensation; that's up to the dealer, whether they work salary, straight commission, or something in between.

The "Throughput" Myth!

David Ruggles

Much has been written and spoken by the administration and in the media about the bankrupt Chrysler and GM Dealers lack of “throughput” as if it is a big drag on Manufacturer viability. This is used to justify the rejection of “deficient” and “extraneous” Dealers. It was pointed out in the Wall Street Journal recently that Toyota Dealers average 1613 new units per year while Chevrolet averages 643 and Dodge 408. The piece used the word “disastrous” to describe Buick Dealers’ 102 unit per year average, as if “throughput” is a settled issue as a negative. It is common knowledge that the administration’s automotive “task force” views “throughput” as a critical element to Chrysler and GM’s future profitability and is using Toyota as their benchmark.
In truth, new vehicle “throughput” has little to do with either Dealer or OEM profitability. For Dealers profitability has everything to do with the ratio of overhead to overall sales, which includes pre-owned, service, parts, etc. Dealers who have been committed to higher overhead levels are desperate to increase new vehicle “throughput” just to break even. Dealers who have been able to keep their overhead under control are less vulnerable to the vagaries of the overall automotive market and to the fact that Manufacturer offerings run hot and cold. Dealers who have learned to maximize the results of their other profit centers are also less vulnerable. In my own experience I ran the 2nd most profitable Chrysler dealership in the Chicago zone in the early eighties. We never sold as many as 100 units in a month. We were making $50 K a month in 1982 dollars during the peak of the Chrysler bailout crisis of that era. Chrysler had not succeeded in getting us to move into a higher overhead facility and otherwise boost our overhead. The profit leader was a large fleet dealer that had to sell thousands of units a year to beat our profit numbers. During that same era, Long Chevrolet, a Dealership that still holds the record for yearly new vehicle “throughput,” was shuttered and bankrupt. And for Manufacturers, each Dealer is a profit center, not an expense.
Toyota, with their high “throughput,” has one of the lowest J.D. Power “SSI” figures of any Manufacturer’s Dealers. “SSI” is Sales Satisfaction Index. Toyota’s high “throughput” must contribute to the fact that their customers are highly dissatisfied with their purchase experience even though they love their Toyota vehicles. Toyota’s sales numbers have tumbled along with the rest of the industry in recent months. Using Toyota as a model may not be the most intelligent benchmark for the “task force” to use as they have posted record losses recently.
It is widely understood within Toyota, and within the industry, that one big reason for the lack of success of Toyota’s superb new truck, the Tundra, is their lack of Dealer coverage. Adding Toyota Dealers will tend to lower each one’s “throughput.” It has been proven that truck owners, who tend to be loyal to their brand anyway, prefer to drive say 30 miles to their nearest Ford, Chevrolet, or Dodge Dealer than drive over a hundred miles to a Toyota store. Further, court documents in Chrysler’s bankruptcy included comments by Jim Press, ex Toyota exec, which indicate he is aware that shedding Dealers is counterproductive to Chrysler’s profitability. If he’s right, lowering the Dealer count to increase “throughput” is counter productive.
According to Joe Eberhardt, Chrysler’s senior vice president for sales and marketing, when a Manufacturer’s loses a Dealer, OEM costs stay the same and–at least in the short term–it loses that Dealer’s new vehicle and parts sales. “There’s no immediate payback,” he stated.
Arbitrarily stating that high “throughput” is an essential element to the viability of Chrysler and GM may sound good to those who think the “Factory” owns all of its’ Dealerships, but those in the know ain’t buying it. If the “task force” actually believes this, and they are in charge of fixing the two ailing automakers, we’re all in trouble! In the meantime, Ford and other competitors are gloating and making absolutely no moves to raise their Dealer’s “throughput” by reducing their Dealer count. I suspect there will be immediate moves by GM and Chrysler’s competitors to pick up some additional market representation by forming relationships with “rejected” Dealers and by securing abandoned GM and Chrysler facilities.