Showing posts with label Smitka. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Smitka. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 19, 2014

Who is Number One?

Auto sales are not the only measure to assess an auto OEM's relative health. This piece from the Detroit Bureau lays it out:

  • GM slid to third when it comes to units sold for the first half of 2014. And focusing on just the most recent quarter, the Detroit maker fell to fourth when it comes to gross revenues.
  • GM reported gross sales of $39 billion for the April to June quarter, noted Autoline: Detroit Editor John McElroy, putting it well behind Germany’s multi-brand Volkswagen AG, at $68 billion. That was well ahead of even the industry’s leader from a unit sales standpoint, Toyota, which managed a still-hefty $62 billion in revenues.
  • The big surprise was Daimler AG, which managed to nudge past GM with $42 billion in second-quarter revenues. GM, in turn, managed to squeak past the Euro-Asian Renault-Nissan Alliance by just $100 million.
  • Ford Motor Co. delivered $37 million in revenue, with fast-growing Korean siblings, Hyundai-Kia reporting $33 billion. The newly merged Fiat Chrysler had combined revenues of $31 billion. Rounding out the list of major global plays, Honda revenues came in at $29 billion, with BMW in the industry’s 10th spot at $26 billion.

Thursday, August 7, 2014

Auto Finance Sub Prime Bubble?

I don't think so. For some reason, the New York times jumped on an Equifax report, cherry picked data to suit a sensationalistic agenda, and published the piece on Dealbook (link). Many have weighed in since, including myself – see below! Other examples are Marketwatch and a NYT Op-Ed

Written for Auto Finance News

By David Ruggles

A recent report from Equifax Inc., which noted that originations and total outstanding balances for subprime auto loans have hit recent highs, triggered an alarmist article on subprime lending in The New York Times. In the July 19 piece, authors Jessica Silver-Greenburg and Michael Corkery cited anecdotes that leave the impression that fraudulent practices are widespread. They castigate the “high” interest rates on subprime loans without mentioning the high rate and expense of default and repossession. Repos can reach a third of originations, and collection practices ― which are expensive to begin with ― are a challenge on these loans.

Through April, 2.6 million subprime loans were originated, representing 32% of all auto loan originations, according to Equifax. The outstanding balance of those subprime loans totaled $46.2 billion, an eight-year high. Equifax defines “subprime” as loans to customers with credit scores of 640 or below. As a matter of record, though, in some circles, a loan is deemed subprime when the credit score drops to 580.

The American Financial Services Association and other industry professionals have since weighed in on the NYT article, noting that it enflames already-riled regulators. And Derek Kreindler, managing editor of TheTruthAboutCars.com blog, writes: “Don’t expect that 32% figure to let up anytime soon. The glut of credit available for auto financing ― driven by securitized subprime auto loans being sold as investment-grade instruments ― is going to keep the auto financing business alive and kicking for the foreseeable future.”

I have seen many articles trumpeting the danger of the expansion of subprime without proper context. It is one thing to have data, but quite another to interpret it properly. In the Equifax report, Deputy Chief Economist Dennis Carlson called the increase in subprime lending “good news,” adding that “a fully functioning second-chance market is essential for a healthy economy.”

I would be pleased if people would stop acting like subprime auto financing had a damn thing to do with the global economic meltdown in 2008. It didn’t. Subprime auto financing is nothing like the subprime home lending issues of the past decade, and $46 billion of total outstanding balances on all subprime loans is miniscule compared with the size of the overall economy and a drop in the bucket compared with the mortgage market.

Meanwhile, the ratio of subprime auto originations, including the buy-here, pay-here sector, has hovered around the 30%-to-35% mark for more than a decade. After all, more than a third of the population has a credit score below 640. Kind of makes sense, right? People need cars, and those originations include new and used loans, although they are mostly used.

To be clear, despite the sky-is-falling tone of the NYT piece, Equifax said “serious” delinquencies of 60-plus days remained near all-time lows, and represented less than 1% of total outstanding balances.

A quick call to Melinda Zabritski, director of auto finance at credit bureau Experian, revealed the following: First, the Great Recession spurred the average credit score of U.S. consumers to take the hit one would intuitively expect. Second, when credit dried up, many people ― except for the highest credit score consumers ― turned to BHPH or subprime finance, as one might expect. The stat cited in the NYT article compared subprime originations today with the dark days of the credit crisis, when capital for that kind of lending was completely dried up. Why pick a point in time that is obviously an anomaly, if one is trying to tell a story in real context?

Third, lenders are looking at the near-prime and subprime markets in a search for yield unavailable in the highly competitive prime lending space. Fourth, fast-track credit ― the point at which a dealer can send a contract to a lender without first calling it in for formal approval ― is now 720, up from 690. There are more strict debt-to-income and loan-to-value parameters, as well. Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, millions of consumers have been able to rehabilitate their credit through subprime financing ― and there will be millions more. An accurate portrayal of the Sub Prime market would have at least mentioned this.

There are some who equate subprime auto lending to with mortgages made under the Community Reinvestment Act. Nothing could be further from the truth. CRA mortgages are NOT inherently "Sub Prime." According to the Federal Reserve, CRA mortgages have outperformed the mortgage market overall.

Also, as a matter of record, most of the mortgages that soured during the mortgage crisis were not subprime. Many people with excellent credit walked away from mortgages where they were paying off, for example, $450,000 on a $250,000 home. Yes, their credit score took a hit, and they might have had to get a subprime auto loan to buy a car. It will take some time to repair all the damaged credit. This has played its own part in the slow economic recovery.

Despite the NYT piece, clearly fueled by a desire to create controversy where the facts don’t indicate controversy exists, it’s time for everyone to take a deep breath and keep both feet firmly planted on the ground. There is no subprime bubble.

Saturday, June 14, 2014

Janet Yellen's Dashboard

Once a quarter, Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen and her colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee take a thorough look at where the U.S. economy has been and then make projections for where they think it’s going. The next batch of those predictions—for unemployment, inflation, growth and interest rates—will be released on June 18. Ms. Yellen will discuss them at her quarterly press conference. (Brookings link)

David Ruggles

Friday, May 23, 2014

Transparency, and Some Retail Auto Industry History

Ruggles

“Transparency” is one of the new buzz words in the retail auto industry these days. Dealers are urged to be transparent with their consumers because vendors tell us that’s what consumers want. These vendors tell us being “transparent” is the best way to win them over, as if all consumers think the same and all consumers mean what they say. Let’s take a look at transparency in the context of some retail auto business history.

First, there are a variety of definitions of “transparency.” True transparency is when the seller and the consumer have the same information as well as the equal ability to interpret that information.

I broke into the retail auto business in 1970 in a Chrysler dealership in Rock Island Illinois, Learner’s Sales and Service. Chryslers and Imperials had a 22.5% markup with a 2% “holdback.” Furys had an 18.5% markup with the 2% holdback while Valiants and Dusters had 14.5% with 2% HB. There was very little “trunk money” or incentive money paid to the dealer by the OEM back of “hold back.” There might have been some “stair step” programs around “build out” but as a general rule, gross profit was made ABOVE invoice with the “hold back” retained by the dealer. Some dealers took “hold back quarterly, some took it yearly. Our dealership had a $125. “pack” on new vehicles and none on preowned. The dealership used “washout method” accounting, where the new vehicle profit wasn’t shown until all trades on it had been sold. This was considered to be a good method of tax deferment, but was otherwise not such a smart program. All one had to do was lose track of where one was in the trade chain and it was easy to make a mistake if one wasn’t mindful of the true market value of a piece of inventory versus what the dealership actually had in it. But I digress. Everyone doesn’t find these things as interesting as I do.

From this point in in 1970, where gross profit was largely made ABOVE invoice less holdback, lets move forward in history. In 1970, sales were slow. The economy entered recession. The 1971 vehicles were awful. It was the first year for lowered compression ratios and unleaded gasoline. Not only did we lose most of the high compression ratio vehicles in model year 1971, we lost the 5 year 50K Chrysler warranty. Insurance companies had killed the popular performance cars, the Viet Nam war was underway, and the country was in the doldrums. Richard Nixon imposed a wage and price “freeze” which later came back to bite Jimmie Carter and the national economy in the ass. I worked for a salary and a commission of $10. per car sale. The gas for my demo was paid for by the dealership. We referred to ourselves as “Moral Motors” as we thought it was smart to charge everyone the same margin. We lost a lot of gross profit by offering up the standard discount to everyone, and “walked” a lot of deals when we turned down cheaper deals, eagerly gobbled up by our competitors. We thought we made it up in volume. The dealership had been in existence since the 1920s, and had long been paid for. And we had a large repeat clientele due to excellent customer service on the decidedly crappy quality Chrysler product as well as a robust leasing operation. Yes, we leased cars in 1970. In fact, the little Rock Island dealership was the largest Imperial dealership in the Chicago Zone and 5 guys would deliver over 100 vehicles some months. In 1972 Nixon repealed the “Excise Tax” on cars and the retail business exploded until the Oil Crisis of late 1973, when things went back in the tank. But let’s get back to the “transparency” issue.

Over time, the markup shrunk and the “hold back” grew to 3%. The OEMs shrunk the markup to allow them to raise their wholesale price without raising the retail price, figuring to take margin from the dealer and retain it for themselves. They did this under the guise of telling us real retail guys that consumers were suspicious of large markups and over allowances and that if we kept the shown numbers closer to the real numbers, consumers would be happier. Something else happened to transform the retail auto business in 1975. Joe Garagiola and Chrysler invented “Buy a Car, Get a Check.” The cost of the rebates and the eventual interest rate subventions, an eventual consequence of inflation that followed the Nixon Wage and Price Freeze, had to come from somewhere. OEMs included the cost in the dealer wholesale price while continuing to keep the lid on MSRP and the dealer markup to mitigate “sticker shock” to consumers. This was the first time consumers were taking delivery of a new vehicle for a price LESS than the dealer had to pay off at his floor plan bank.

Over the course of time we have seen dealer gross profit move from above invoice to below invoice based on a convoluted combination of “trunk money” that is earned from “stair step” sales incentives to purchase incentives as well as CSI payments and additional vehicle incentives based on OEM image programs. This “trunk money” system is FAR less transparent to consumers than the old system. Don’t get me wrong. I do NOT believe consumers have any right to know our true costs, even though vendors like TrueCar CEO Scott Painter say that hiding that true dealer cost information from consumers is costing the industry 4 million new vehicle sales per year because it creates “friction” in the selling process. Dealers often don’t know their true cost per vehicle until a particular program ends, and that is what grates Painter and others.

The “new” gross profit system is also designed to hide salient cost information from dealership staff who get paid based on a percentage of real gross profit. A cynical person might say that dealers aren’t likely to be “transparent” with consumers until they are first “transparent” with their own employees.

The information provided to auto retail consumers these days is vast. For them it is like drinking from a fire hose. There is so much “cost information” available even dealers and their staff have a difficult time interpreting it. It is anything but “transparent” to consumers. Its none of their business anyway any more than it is our business as consumers to know what our grocer paid for a head of lettuce. The system has evolved to the point it is designed like your cable TV or cell phone bill to be difficult to fathom while pretending to provide ALL the information. This is deceptive. It is FAR from “transparent.” In fact, it was NEVER meant to be “transparent.”

To be sure there has been distinct improvement in certain kinds of “transparency” over the last decades, in particular, in the area of Truth in Lending finance disclosure and with the FTC mandated pre-owned disclosure. Legal transparency should be followed to both the letter and the spirit of the law. No one should have a problem with either of these and other similar requirements.

Auto retail is the business of negotiation. For those who don’t have the stomach for it, I suggest they find another career path. There has always been artful negotiation and those who aren’t so artful. This allows those with polish and good technique to excel. It gives consumers the option of buying from the salesperson/dealership that provides them what makes them the most comfortable. To claim “transparency” while at the same time working within a system that is unnecessarily complex and designed to confuse to the advantage of the seller is duplicitous at best. I’d suggest we stop embarrassing ourselves by using the word. Consumers ain’t buying it. We don’t even buy it ourselves. Let’s get back to artful negotiation, sell some cars, and make some gross profit without claiming to provide something we’re not.

Friday, February 21, 2014

Federal Agency Should Stop Playing Guessing Games

David Ruggles

Here I'm posting a few points I made in "Federal Agency Should Stop Playing Guessing Games" published February 21st in WardsAuto.com. You can read the full article on Wards.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has socked Ally Bank with $98 million in penalties and restitution requirements as part of a consent agreement stemming from unintended discrimination involving dealer-assisted car loans.

Ally facilitated discrimination, according to a CFPB analysis using “proxy methodology” that presumes to determine who is and isn’t a member of a government-designated “protected class” by means of a borrower’s first name, last name, zip code and other variables.

....

So here’s a solution.

First, the CFPB should provide access to their proxy methodology so dealers can analytically determine up front who is and isn’t a member of a protected class.

....

Second, the CFPB should prescribe exactly what special treatment it wants protected- class members to receive. It can be business as usual for everyone else.

Absent this, the CFPB should leave the current system of indirect lending alone with the understanding that the bureau’s inaccurate proxy methodology has only turned up the possibility of the miniscule potential rate markup overcharge of a third of a percent. That certainly is within the margin of error for so imperfect a system designed to identify protected-class borrowers.

If the CFPB wants to institute a protected-class database, it should do so using actual data, rather than the guesswork it has been employing so far.

A line that got lost in editing:

"I can't wait to get my "protected class" membership card for being 65 and being bald." Another deletion included a reference to "SWAG," a term not deemed appropriate for a trade publication.

Comments Welcome! There will be a lot more published on this issue in the coming days.

Saturday, August 3, 2013

GM, and Ford – Onward and Upward?



As of this writing, the stock price of General Motors closed at almost $37.00, while Ford closed at about $17.  Both announced strong second quarter profit results.  Have GM and Ford peaked?

I’m not in the business of giving buy/sell stock recommendations but a discussion of both the head winds and tail winds the Detroit 2 automakers face going forward might be interesting.  

In the case of GM, the current stock price represents a degree of redemption.  GM’s Initial Public Offering stock was priced at $33.00 in November 2010, after it emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Immediately after the IPO the stock price took a quick jump to near $40.00, then dove to a low point of around $18.00 as recently as 18 months ago.  Some RW pundits, including Forbes, were predicting GM would be back on bended knee to the U.S. Government looking for funds to survive.   Since the IPO, GM has hemorrhaging cash in Europe as was the old GM.  

But after a decent first quarter in2013, GM just announced a $1.2 billion profit for the second quarter.  The company holds over $44 billion dollars in cash and credit and is rolling out new and well accepted models every few weeks, it seems.  The company enjoys a favorable UAW contract for the next few years, and is selling into a U.S. auto market with considerable pent up demand.  Chevrolet is setting sales records, and a resurgent Cadillac has restored brand prestige.  In fact, production restraints from cutbacks made during the bankruptcy period restrain current production and profits. 
It is expected that the U.S. Government will complete its sell off of GM stock in 2014.  In the middle of all of this, GM and its stockholders enjoy a gift provided by the Federal Government.  The new GM was granted “loss carry forwards” from the old GM that could amount to $45 billion in tax savings in the coming years.  That’s a lot of money that can be deployed in new technology and model development.  

On the flip side, GM’s market share remains a challenge.  Toyota has regained the mantle of world’s largest auto manufacturer.  There are no big captive finance arm profits contributing to overall results as there used to be with the old GM and its captive GMAC before GMAC got involved in mortgage lending.  For perspective, GM Financial, GM’s new “owned captive,” contributed $264 billion to GM’s bottom line. Ford Motor Credit contributed $454 million to Ford’s bottom line on about 20% fewer vehicle sales.  Ally Bank, GM’s “non owned captive,” and the old GMAC, is using its own profits to pay back to U.S. taxpayers for keeping it alive during the 2008 – 2010 crisis. 
Europe remains a challenge for GM.  Vice Chairman Steve Girsky has been been dispatched there to deal with the morass of labor and bureaucratic issues in a market that doesn’t look like it will rebound any time soon.  But the losses in Europe have recently been trimmed.

There continues to be executive shuffling at GM.  There are a couple of major exec announcements a month with high level executives either being “broomed” or leaving for “personal reasons.” The Board of Directors has developed no plan for CEO Dan Ackerson’s successor and seems to be particularly dysfunctional.  Ackerson himself seems to be a challenge for GM employee morale.  Even the rapid growth in China has been tempered recently.  GM’s recent buy into Peugeot is interesting.  Noted auto industry analyst Maryann Keller referred to that recent investment as “GM buying in to a “black hole.” 
 
Ford’s stock had reached low ebb in November 2008, closing as low as $1.26.  The stock price peaked at $19.00 in January 2011, driven by Cash for Clunkers euphoria and auto industry exuberance caused by the record GM IPO. The current stock price represents a significant recovery from $9.20 in November 2011.  The company just announced a second quarter pre-tax profit of $2.6 billion, which is more than GM on fewer sales.  The company states their liquidity as $37.1 billion.  Ford recently doubled its dividend to 10 cents per share, its highest in seven years.  according to Reuters. 
Ford also benefits from the same beneficial UAW contract it gained from UAW as a consequence of the overall U.S. auto industry reorganization. Ford Motor Credit contributes greatly to the parent company’s bottom line.

Ford, like GM, is challenged in Europe and is facing market share erosion at home.    Ford has to compete with two U.S. competitors, Chrysler and GM, which shed debt through their bankruptcies, while having to pay all of its own obligations.  The company continues to struggle with the Lincoln brand, having shed its Mercury division.  

On balance, things look good overall going forward for both automakers, despite the obvious challenges.  Europe won’t be in the economic doldrums forever.  Despite declining market share in the U.S., the home market seems to be advancing toward the old standard of a 17 million SAAR. (Seasonally Averaged Annual Rate)  As costs stay in line and sales continue to advance with the expanding SAAR, without huge incentives required to achieve them, profitability should stay strong for the both automakers for the foreseeable future.  Some analysts see Ford as a $40.00 stock with GM at $60.00.  Time will tell.   

Thursday, July 25, 2013

Taxpayers Will Lose Money on GM Investment

... calculate what it would have cost to NOT rescue the auto industry...

Below are comments on the following article.

GM Share Price Needs to Triple for Taxpayers to Beak Even by Paul Eisenstein

The good news for shareholders is that General Motors shares are on a rise, gaining more than 25% in value so far this year – and reaching a $37.45 high during Wednesday trading before settling back a bit.

Good news, perhaps, but not good enough for U.S. taxpayers who received 61% of GM’s equity in exchange for a $50 billion bailout linked to the maker’s 2009 bankruptcy. While the increase is likely to benefit the U.S. Treasury as it continues selling down its stake in the Detroit maker, the latest report by a special federal watchdog cautions that GM shares would have to nearly triple – to $95.51 a share – for the government to break even. “There’s no question that Treasury, the taxpayers, are going to lose money on the GM investment,” Special Inspector General Christy Romero told the Associated Press.

GM received $49.5 billion to complete its restructuring, a bailout initiated by former President George W. Bush in 2008 and completed by his successor, Barack Obama, in 2009 as the maker exited a managed bankruptcy. The White House also approved a bailout for GM’s crosstown rival, Chrysler, but only after Italian automaker Fiat stepped in and effectively assumed control.

The White House has said repeatedly that it has no interest in being in the car business. And it began selling down its stake in November 2010 when GM staged its initial public offering. Priced at $33 a share, it reduced the Treasury’s stake to 33%.

Late last year, the government announced plans to sell off the remaining stock by April of 2014. That followed heavy pressure on the Obama Administration during the 2012 presidential campaign during which Republican candidate Mitt Romney said he would sell off the remaining stock immediately. Ironically, that would have been at a low point when GM was trading at barely $18 a share and such a move might have pushed losses on the sale to nearly $20 billion. In recent months, as GM stock has rebounded, pushing part the November 2010 IPO price, the Treasury has accelerated its sell-off.

While some observers had worried that could actually hurt the stock price GM has been benefiting from other positive factors, such as the rebounding U.S. automotive market – which is now approaching sales levels not seen since 2007. GM also got a psychological boost with its recent return to the closely followed S&P 500 stock index. Because many funds are required to buy shares covered by the index, analysts believe that has boosted demand for the automaker’s stock, driving up its price.

As of June 6, the latest date covered by the Special Inspector General’s report, Washington still held 189 million shares of GM, or 14% of the outstanding stock. To cover the outstanding balance as of that date – a total of $18.1 billion, the government would need a $95.51 share price, the report noted. Were the stock to be sold at the stock price at that point of $36.61 a share, it would still lose about $11.2 billion on the bailout.  The escalating price of GM stock could further reduce the loss but there are no indications that GM stock could come close to the point of a break-even, industry analysts warn.

The other maker to receive a bailout, Chrysler, has repeatedly said that it paid off the government in full for its rescue. That is partially true. The “new” Chrysler that emerged from Chapter 11 has paid off the loan it received after bankruptcy. But about $2.9 billion that was loaned to Chrysler before its bankruptcy filing was assigned to the “old” Chrysler and written off as a loss.

Ruggles writes: In terms of the actual funds advanced, there is no way taxpayers break even on the GM investment.... at least on the surface. Now if we could calculate what it would have cost to NOT rescue the auto industry we could compare that number with what will be lost when taxpayers sell their last share of GM stock. A paragraph from WIKI follows:

"In microeconomic theory, the opportunity cost of a choice is the value of the best alternative forgone, in a situation in which a choice needs to be made between several mutually exclusive alternatives given limited resources. Assuming the best choice is made, it is the "cost" incurred by not enjoying the benefit that would be had by taking the second best choice available. "The New Oxford American Dictionary defines it as "the loss of potential gain from other alternatives when one alternative is chosen". Opportunity cost is a key concept in economics, and has been described as expressing "the basic relationship between scarcity and choice."

Another way to look at it? The choice between "moral hazard" and Depression. Which do you choose? GM CEO Dan Ackerson has been pushing the government to sell its stock more quickly.  Why?  While the government still owns stock GM has a cap on executive compensation.  Danny wants a raise.

Saturday, May 11, 2013

Transparency and the Car Business

The new buzz word in the Auto Industry these days is “Transparency.” Let’s face it, the word is nothing more than the current euphemism for “One Price,” which has been proven to be an abject failure. The demise of the Ford Collection is the prime example. There are still Dealers using “One Price” as a strategy of Negotiation, but “One Price” ONLY works when there is more demand than supply. A Dealer’s fantasy is to wake up one day and find out that has nearest competitors have all gone “One Price.”

We could revisit the Saturn debacle, but why? How many times does the lesson have to be learned. Does anyone actually think Saturn was a success story?

Ever notice how it is the Silicon Valley types who want to change our business? Ever notice that they have never sold cars on commission or owned a Dealership before they set out to give Consumers what they think they want. These people are experts at running focus groups, although they don’t know the right questions to ask or how to interpret Consumer answers.

So lets set out to thoroughly discuss the issue of “Transparency” as it regards the Car Business.
“In economics, a market is transparent if much is known by many about:
There are two types of price transparency: 1) I know what price will be charged to me, and 2) I know what price will be charged to you. The two types of price transparency have different implications for differential pricing.

A high degree of market transparency can result in disintermediation due to the buyer's increased knowledge of supply pricing.

In economics, disintermediation is the removal of intermediaries in a supply chain, or "cutting out the middleman". Instead of going through traditional distribution channels, which had some type of intermediate (such as a distributor, wholesaler, broker, or agent), companies may now deal with every customer directly, for example via the Internet. One important factor is a drop in the cost of servicing customers directly.

This can also happen in other industries where distributors or resellers operate and the manufacturer wants to increase profit margins, therefore eliminating intermediaries to increase their margins. (In the case of the Auto Industry, the “intermediaries would the franchised new vehicle Dealers.)
“Disintermediation” initiated by consumers is often the result of high market transparency, in that buyers are aware of supply prices direct from the manufacturer. Buyers bypass the middlemen (wholesalers and retailers) to buy directly from the manufacturer, and pay less. (Buyers can also pay MORE because the manufacturer controls the market. Competition between Dealers is what maintains the price equilibrium Consumers aren’t smart or knowledgeable enough to appreciate.)
Price transparency can, however, lead to higher prices, if it makes sellers reluctant to give steep discounts to certain buyers, or if it facilitates collusion.” Excerpts from WIKI
In legal terms, and in the context of the Auto Business, “Transparency” means fully disclosing all information mandated by all applicable laws in exactly the way the law demands these disclosures take place. There is NO legal mandate that the Consumer has to be happy with the transaction. We have always known that a “Good Deal” is largely a state of mind.
Definition of “NEGOTIATE,” Merriam Webster:
  • to confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter.
  • to deal with (some matter or affair that requires ability for its successful handling): manage
  • to arrange for or bring about through conference, discussion, and compromise “ More WIKI Excerpts
A brief historical reference of Transparency Regulation in the context of the Auto Business:
New vehicles did NOT have a stated and posted price until 1958, when a law sponsored by Senator Mike Monroney of Oklahoma was passed. Trucks did not have a priced Monroney label until much later. “The window sticker was named after Almer Stillwell "Mike" Monroney, United States Senator from Oklahoma. Monroney sponsored the Automobile Information Disclosure Act of 1958, which mandated disclosure of information on new automobiles.” WIKI and commonly known

Even if the Consumer is prepared to pay the Auto Dealer’s asking price, the value of any trade in has always been a matter for Negotiation. There is no single wholesale value for any Pre-Owned vehicle. A vehicle is worth whatever a wholesale Buyer will pay at auction in a competitive bid situation on a given day. Typically, Retail Buyer’s want Retail for their trade, thinking the Dealer should sell their trade at Retail just to get their money back, for the privilege of selling a new vehicle.

Even in the most simple purchase situations, where a Dealer states his/her price and the Buyer accepts and makes the purchase, this is still technically a “Negotiation.” The stating of a price is a first pass of Negotiation. Regulation, beginning with the government mandated Monroney label, has forced Dealers to state their price instead of merely entertaining offers on sales. The Monroney law came into being after WW II, when Auto Dealers, who hadn’t had new vehicles to sell for years, were in a short supply, low demand situation. And they took advantage. After all, they had just been through a period of no supply and high demand and had previously experienced high supply and low demand during the Great Depression. Consumers were offended, preferring only to experience a market driven by higher supply than demand.

As a practical matter, it makes no sense for a Dealer to debate “transparency” with Consumers OR with those who have never had the experience of making a livelihood by selling vehicles or with those with a major investment in an Auto Dealership. They have no standing on the issue. In the Auto Business it becomes clear quickly that without substantial gross profit, one doesn’t eat very well. The Sales Person’s welfare or the Dealer making a profit are NOT concerns of most Consumers. Consumers typically have no understanding of what a Dealer’s Cost of Sales might be. They don’t typically care. But for some reason many Consumers think they have the right to know a Dealer’s cost structure. These same Consumers seldom ask cost and margin questions of other retailers. At the least they don’t want to pay more than other Buyers of the same product. That’s no surprise. Neither do I. But if I buy from a “One Price” Dealer there is NO ASSURANCE that others aren’t buying for less than I do. After all, there are always competitive Dealers who are happy to work from their “One Price” competitor’s Best Price.

All car buyers negotiate in some fashion and to some degree. Car buyers typically think they are entitled to be quoted a price to take to competitive Auto Dealers. The first Dealer either accommodates, or doesn’t. If the Buyer doesn’t like a Dealer’s Negotiation Strategy, they are free to find one that gives them what they want. In other words, the market works in the Buyer’s favor. The Car Buyer can find another Dealer more quickly than the Dealer can find another Buyer. Consumers are NOT held to the same laws and ethics that Dealers are obligated to. So the Consumer holds all of the advantages, EXCEPT, in most cases, the Dealer has more experience Negotiating car deals and possesses more accurate information. Providing equal information to a Car Buyer would, in theory, create an efficient market that could commoditize new vehicles. This could theoretically eliminate Dealers. But then who would take the trades? Who would arrange the financing? And who would teach Consumers how to interpret all of the information?

In Business, it is also clear that if a Negotiation takes place, and neither party gets their “feathers ruffled,” someone left money on the table.

So what do Car Buyers really want? They want a guarantee that they will WIN the Negotiation. They want a guarantee that the Dealer will quote them a price that they can validate in their own mind by using what the first Dealer provided to shop other competitive Dealers. This has not changed in my 43 years in the Auto Business. Only the method of delivery of the information has changed, as well as they ease with which a Consumer can shop. If a Dealer doesn’t play along, they are vilified, not only by Consumers, but OFTEN by 3rd Party Vendors who appeal to Consumers and who also depend on Auto Dealers for revenue. But the Market works. If Consumers are unhappy with one Dealer, they can go to the next. They can also make use of information provided by the Vendors, although these Vendors are at risk if they also depend on Dealers for revenue.

As it involves the varying definitions of “Negotiation,” many Car Buyers would prefer to have the Dealer disclose the triple net cost of their product, and then “Negotiate” the “Margin.”
So how does one sell New Vehicles in this environment? Most Dealers attempt to provide Consumers with a “Perception of Transparency” as a Negotiating strategy, since TRUE Transparency would prevent making a Gross Profit high enough to pay overhead expenses. We currently do not have true Transparency and we are still seeing considerable margin compression.

The Consumer has the ability to shop until they find an Auto Dealer Negotiation strategy they like. Some give up and buy because they were worn down, lost patience, and gave in. Others depend on the Dealer to arrange financing which may be more important to them than the price of the vehicle.
Despite the massive amount of regulation that has been imposed on the Retail Auto Business, the current Market Driven system has sold up to 17 million vehicles in a year. Some might say the system has served us well over the years despite the fact that many Consumers are aggravated by the process. To those Consumers, I say, “Keep shopping until you find the Dealership shopping experience that gives you what you want.” Let the Market work.

Dealers are not typically completely “Transparent” with their own Sales People and Managers. Why should they be? It is human nature for Sellers to give away potential profit in an effort to make a sale. The cost structure of a new vehicle is so complicated that even Dealership management staff has a hard time understanding it. In many cases, the true cost structure is not determined until a Dealer receives a check based on the achievement of objective over a period of months. With all of the possible incentives, including “Conquest Incentives, “Realator Incentives, Plumber Incentives, Glass Company Incentives, First Time Buyer Incentives, Fleet Incentives, Special Bid Incentives, College Grad Incentives, Employee Purchases, various “Private Offers,” Returned Military Incentives, and many more, plus variations of the above. Trying to provide all of this information, including teaching Consumers the elements of the wholesale market would be overwhelming to most. It would be akin to drinking from a fire hose. There is a considerable learning curve when training new Sales People. Consumers aren’t typically going to understand it all when they are only buying a vehicle every few years.

New hires entering the Auto Business as Sales People bring their perceptions as a Consumer to their new job. Like me 43 years ago, most were convinced in the beginning that selling cars would be easy. All one would have to do is to quote the lowest price and make up the loss of margin in additional volume. What a revelation us veterans of the business had when we found out that Consumers had no loyalty. There has never been such a thing as the “best price,” despite the fact that Consumers typically think there is. As an early “price quoter” I was the one who spent the time, gave a detailed product presentation and demo drive, only to find many of my prospects, who had promised to “Be Back,” had bought from a competitor who had beaten my “Best Price” by a small margin. Occasionally, deals are lost because one appraiser might see more value in a trade in than another.
To be clear, some Auto Dealer attempts at negotiation are more “artful” than others, and crude attempts at Negotiation generally fail. The Consumer isn’t harmed, except for some wasted time. They are certainly given “grist for the mill” in their complaints about “Negotiation.” They are free to keep shopping for that Dealer who gives them what they seek. But then some Consumers are never satisfied.

I recall a time when my boss, the Dealer himself, quoted me a price that involved a $1K mistake in my Customer’s favor. I presented this price to my Customer who then railed about us being crooks, cheats, and liars. After shopping our quoted price the Customer later slunk back into our Dealership to take try to take advantage of the mistaken quote. And because we didn’t honor the price from two days earlier, we were crooks, cheats, and robbers all over again. A good deal is as much perception as reality.

Let’s discuss “Transparency” as a practical matter in the modern Internet driven Auto Market. The most demanding Consumers are the ones who have 720 and higher credit scores. They know they have good credit and can buy what they want. They are the ones who are most analytical and the most demanding of information to shop with. They are the ones who feel most entitled to be able to determine the “Best Price” from the convenience of their office chair using the Internet, entertain competitive quotes from Dealers all vying for their business, and to make a purchase decision without spending a lot of time or going through a more traditional process of negotiation. They will typically visit a dealership for a demo drive and to gather additional information, then retreat to their computer to use the Internet to “Negotiate” the price as they try, often successfully, to get Dealers into a bidding war with each other. The fact is, this niche of Buyers make a LOT MORE NOISE than their numbers would indicate. This group makes up LESS THAN 30% of Consumers. And of that 30%, at least 5% of those have a debt payment to income ratio that does NOT guarantee them financing. All other Car Buyers have a legitimate concern that they might not gain credit approval for a Car Loan at optimum terms and interest rates. AND without the help of Dealers and their market power, many of these could NOT gain a car loan on their own. Does anyone with common sense believe that the Retail Auto Industry should turn itself upside down over 25% percent of Consumers who represent less than 15% of total Vehicle Sales Gross Profit?
 
In this current environment Manufacturers are coercing Dealers into ever higher overheads through ridiculous “Image Programs.” What happens if margin compression makes the selling of vehicles unprofitable to Auto Dealers? A quick look at history will give an indication. When I entered the auto business in 1970, the Markup on large vehicles was 22.5 percent, plus a 2 – 2.5% “Hold Back” that was paid to the Dealer every quarter or at year end. Imports typically had no “Hold Back” in those days. Deals were transacted OVER “Invoice,” the amount the Manufacturer drafts the Dealer’s floor plan account when the vehicle leaves the assembly plant, sometimes before. There was little “Trunk Money,” money rebated to the dealer based on “Stair Step” programs and other incentives based on achievement of an assigned objective. In other words, “Invoice” had meaning. Today “Invoice” has little meaning. Consumers routinely take delivery of a new vehicle for LESS than the Dealer has to pay off at his/her lender. The “Markup over invoice today is less than 10%. Manufacturers have raised the MSRP to accommodate both the cost of rebates and subventions, but also the “Trunk Money.” In 1970 F&I revenue represented a relatively small portion of Gross Profit on a per deal basis. Today the per deal F&I gross profit runs from $1K to $1.5K. Labor rates in Dealer Service Departments were reasonable in 1970. Today, $100. plus per flat rate hour isn’t unusual. Are you starting to get it now?

Many Consumers think Manufacturers should cut their Franchise Dealers out of the equation. First, there are laws in place to protect those Dealers, all of whom have made substantial investments in their businesses. Secondly, the OEMs would need Ben Bernanke's printing presses running full time to ever come up with the amount of capital required to replace their Dealers. It ain't gonna happen.

The Bottom Line:
  1. Consumers already have the market slanted in their favor
  2. Consumers can readily shop
  3. If Consumers don’t want to “Haggle,” let them find a Dealer who will give them what they want.
  4. Vendors who started their businesses depending on dealers for their initial revenue, and who now turn on those dealers and demonize them in an effort to convince consumers to turn to them for “protection” from the villains, and who provide even more downward pressure on gross profits, can expect push back and a lack of cooperation from auto dealers.
TrueCar, CarFax, Cars.com, and some others have paid a price for pushing Dealers too far by providing Consumers additional tools to help them in the effort to compress margins, often depending on Dealers to support their efforts. These Companies have every right to do what they are doing and/or have done, but they are unrealistic if they expect there to be no push back from Dealers. I suspect there are some others, including Kelly Blue Book and their version of the “Bell Curve, recently abandoned by TrueCar while under fire from Dealers, who will be a target for Dealer push back.

As long as the Franchise Dealer system is in place, trades are taken, and financing not a given, there will be no completely “Transparent” and “Efficient Market” that commoditizes pricing in the Retail New Vehicle Business. Is this a surprise, or just common sense? The current system has served us well and will continue to do so. 
 
At the recent JD Power/NADA conference held in March in New York City, noted Auto Industry analyst Maryann Keller spoke optimistically about the conventional system of selling cars in the U.S. “Over four decades, I’ve heard many arguments made against the Franchise Dealer system.” They are claims Dealers never fail to disprove time and time again.”

One myth promulgated in the 1990s, and now resurfacing with Tesla’s effort to run its own sales outlets, is that factory stores save money by reducing distribution expenses, wrongly estimated at 30% of the total cost of a car.

Put aside for a moment that the percentage itself is way off, Keller says. Ford’s ill-fated Auto Collection experiment in certain markets during the late 1990s proved that Auto Companies are good at a lot of things. Running Dealerships isn’t among them. Dealers with entrepreneurial spirit are good at doing that.

Ford ended its bad-science experiment after a couple of years of market share losses and mounting evidence that Factory Stores do not deliver a better customer experience nor reduce costs.
Franchise dealers’ cumulative investment in land, equipment and facilities easily exceeds $100 million, Keller says. “Dealers fund 60 days of inventory and another month of inventory in transit that would otherwise fall to the Auto Maker.”

The inventory buffer allows auto makers to adjust future production levels. For a company like Ford, U.S. inventory funding equals about $15 billion at any point.

“While we are talking about myths, how about the still-repeated one that people hate Dealers so, if given the chance, they will buy a car online,” Keller says. “I almost don’t know where to start in taking this one apart.”

Not all that long ago, Silicon Valley funded and lost hundreds of millions, maybe even a billion dollars, on ill-fated ventures that promised to sell cars online.

“CarOrder.com, Greenlight.com, and CarsDirect.com (in its original configuration), among others, all promised to avoid the dealership experience,” Keller says. “A few actually did that by buying cars from Dealers, and then reselling them at lower prices to customers until they blew through their capital.”

She recalls the defunct Build to Order.com. It proposed that customers would place orders for fully customized cars while lounging in a company-owned showroom/entertainment center. “Build-to-order.com never built anything for anyone,” Keller says. Priceline.com’s experiment of trying to sell cars online was in some respects replicated later by TrueCar.com, which ran afoul of franchise laws for the same reasons Priceline did.

“What I learned then, and this is still true today, is that we could connect Buyers with Dealers and that the price of a vehicle was the easiest part of a deal,” Keller says. “The other elements are harder to control and often the cause of frustration for the Customer and the Dealer. People don’t like to hear that their trade isn’t worth the value they saw online or that their poor credit doesn’t qualify them for the no-down-payment, 0% loan.”
Buying a car is as complex as buying a house, Keller says. “Why should we think it should be as easy as buying a pair of shoes from Zappos with a return receipt in the box in case they don’t fit?” While much Auto Advertising has shifted from newspapers to the Internet, that transition “has not reduced Advertising expense per vehicle or made buying a car as easy as buying a book,” she says.

Another salient Keller point:
“Add up all the monthly traffic to all automotive sites, including auto makers, dealers and independent sites, and you’d get more than 100 million, possibly close to 200 million, unique visitors using the Web to get information about buying or selling a new or used car.
Except there’s one problem, if this traffic is somehow supposed to represent potential sales.” Dealers retail about two million new and used cars a month. That’s a fraction of all those automotive website visitors.”
“So just like newspaper, radio or TV advertising, Dealer spend on the Internet is likely no better targeted, once again dispelling the notion that the Internet would solve the age-old problem of knowing which 50% of a dealer’s advertising works.”
Technology is wonderful. Dealers have adapted to it. Sophisticated software helps them manage every aspect of their business. But it will not fundamentally change Auto Retailing, Keller says.
“The system of Franchised Dealers – using their own risk capital to fund their businesses and guarantee millions of dollars of inventory, promote their own brand and that of their OEM, provide the expensive tools needed in their service departments, and manage the endless headache of a workforce – will not be superseded by technology or Factory Owned Mall Stores.”
Keller predicts start ups such as Tesla, which currently runs factory-owned mall stores, ultimately will conclude “the dealer network is the best way.”

I would only add this. As long as Auto Makers understand that Dealers are their Customers and the End User is the Dealer’s Customer, things will be fine.















































Wednesday, January 23, 2013

Henry Ford, A Documentary


Public Broadcasting Service Premiere of 
American Experience Presents Henry Ford 
Tuesday, January 29th, 2013 9:00 – 11:00 PM on PBS
 – A Review by David Ruggles –
additional comments by Mike Smitka
Henry Ford changed the world with his assembly line method of auto assembly, patterned after processes he observed in the meat packing industry. One might think there is nothing new to be learned about the man, his life, and his legacy. And perhaps there isn’t. But I have never found such a wealth of information and insight in one place as in this wonderful documentary directed by Sarah Coit and to be presented by PBS in conjunction with the 150th anniversary of Ford’s birth.
A study in contrasts and contradictions, Henry Ford was a genius who did a lot of good for mankind, while at the same time his behavior presented a case study for the psychiatry profession. Henry Ford began his career at a time in our history when a few plutocrats had combined net worth equal to a major portion of the entire GDP of the country. Before the turn of the century, John David Rockefeller’s net worth alone exceeded 10% of the GDP of the United States. In today’s dollars, that would be the equivalent of about $1.5 Trillion. Together with Andrew Carnegie, J. P Morgan, John Jacob Astor, Andrew Mellon, and others, monopolies controlled the U. S. economy and government policy was bought and sold at will, at least until Teddy Roosevelt signed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 and the graduated income tax was passed in 1913.
When Henry Ford historically doubled the wage of his workers from about $2.50 per day to $5.00 per day, it was a giant step forward for the country’s middle class. He also pioneered both 8 hour work day and the 5 day work week. Ford didn’t make these moves for altruistic reasons alone. His assembly line production method burned out employees. In the face of overwhelming employee turnover he was interested in employee recruitment and retention. He also attached conditions to the wage which were onerous for many employees. Ford’s “Sociological Department” monitored employees through a network of thugs and spies. Heavy drinking, gambling, and other adverse behavior was strongly “discouraged.”

But Ford was visionary in that he understood that by paying a high enough wage, so his own employees could afford to purchase the product they built, he could become more successful himself. It was a radical theory at the time and enraged his competitors, who were forced to match wages or risk losing their best skilled employees to Ford.
At the time, automobiles were toys for the wealthy. Ford’s Model T soon became a necessity for the masses and spawned a mobile culture that led to the country’s highway system, a burgeoning oil industry, motels, fast food, and hosts of related businesses that fueled economic expansion. And Henry Ford showed that the wealthier could do even better if they had a thriving and consuming middle class to sell to. In that respect he did not regard economics as a zero sum game.
Ford later turned on his employees, unleashing the infamous Harry Bennett to intimidate workers.
Ford resisted offering any color other than black to consumers until it became clear his company would fail if he didn’t. [ms: in the days of lacquer-based paints, Ford offered an array of colors; the first successful oven-drying enamel was only available in black, and to offer a mass-produced vehicle required that he move away from the earlier paint technology that required hours to dry between multiple coats. but by 1920 DuPont had developed an array of colors that were used by GM, to Ford's detriment. the DuPont family became GM's largest shareholder]
It was the same with financing. Ford thought debt was evil, and a person did not deserve one of his vehicles if it couldn’t be paid for in cash. He ceded huge market share to General Motors, who pioneered auto financing through General Motors Acceptance Corporation, until Ford was forced to enter the business of auto finance.
He hated the wealthy, even though he was one of the richest men in the world. He regarded investors and stock holders as parasites. He created his own idyllic country retreat, now called Greenfield Village, so he could return at will to the more rural simple life from which he came, despite being the singular impetus himself for modernization and industrialization.
He abused his only son Edsel to the point that Edsel died prematurely of stomach ulcers. It took Edsel standing up to his father to finally get approval to replace the Model T with the Model A. That was the son’s high point in dealing with his father. But Henry resented being proven wrong, and went out of his way to punish Edsel for being right.
Adamantly anti-Semitic, he regularly published inflammatory articles from the local Dearborn newspaper he bought for the purpose. [ms: yet his factories were designed by Alfred Kahn, a leader in the Jewish community in Detroit]
The documentary is full of movie clips from the period, bringing the history of our country’s industrialization and its dependence on the automobile to life. Students of history, economics, the auto industry, AND psychiatry shouldn’t miss the premiere of this most entertaining and enlightening presentation.